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1. The literature advancing intelligent design has been described as “sophisticated, vast,
and growing.”  FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, & PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN 92 (2003).  For
collections of essays advancing and critiquing intelligent design, see DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION (John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer eds., 2003); DEBATING
DESIGN: FROM DARWIN TO DNA (William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse eds., 2004) [hereinafter
DEBATING DESIGN]; and INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS: PHILOSOPHICAL,
THEOLOGICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001) [hereinafter
INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS].  For a collection of essays written solely
by intelligent design theorists and proponents, see MERE CREATION: SCIENCE, FAITH &
INTELLIGENT DESIGN (William A. Dembski ed., 1998) [hereinafter MERE CREATION].  For a
brief introduction to the theory of intelligent design, as well as its asserted empirical basis, see
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MONKEY
WRENCH: EXPLORING THE CASE FOR
INTELLIGENT DESIGN
JOHNNY REX BUCKLES*
Teaching intelligent design in public schools has become an extremely
controversial, and highly publicized, educational prospect that is just
beginning to garner judicial attention.  This Article argues that a proper
resolution of the constitutional problems raised by teaching intelligent design
requires both a precise understanding of intelligent design and evolutionary
theory, and a sophisticated grasp of theological conceptions of the origin and
development of life.  After explaining these important foundational concepts
and surveying the most relevant Supreme Court precedent, this Article
discusses two important threshold questions that arise from the origins debate.
First, is intelligent design theory inherently religious?  Secondly, must science
refrain from referring to supernatural causation?  Answering each question
in the negative, this Article then sketches the analysis necessary for
determining the constitutionality of a state actor’s decision to permit, require,
or forbid the teaching of intelligent design in public school science classes.
Introduction
Intelligent design, a complementary strand of theories advanced by a
budding cadre of scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers, has catalyzed
a keenly intellectual, deeply passionate, and widespread debate.1  Drawing on
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BECKWITH, supra, at 106-17; and David K. DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer & Mark Edward
DeForrest, Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, or Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 39, 59-66.
2. For a succinct explanation of intelligent design, see infra Part I.A.2.
3. The reigning philosophical assumption of science is methodological naturalism.  For
a discussion of methodological naturalism, see infra Part III.B.  For a critique of philosophical
naturalism in general, and methodological naturalism in particular, see the collection of essays
published in NATURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (William Lane Craig & J.P. Moreland eds.,
2000).
4. See Lisa Anderson, Evolution of Intelligent Design, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 2005, § 1, at
1 (“A decade ago most Americans had never heard of intelligent design, or ID.  But, in the last
year, the term has surfaced repeatedly in politics, media and education . . . .”).
5. President Bush has stated that schools should teach both intelligent design and
evolution to expose students to differing perspectives.  See Johanna Neuman, Inspiration for
Doubters of Darwin, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A12.
6. Pope Benedict has called creation an “intelligent project” and criticized those who
argue for a creation lacking direction and order.  See World in Brief, WASH. POST, Nov. 10,
2005, at A23.  However, the official Vatican newspaper recently published the views of an
evolutionary biology professor who characterized intelligent design as unscientific.  See Ian
Fisher & Cornelia Dean, In “Design” vs. Darwinism, Darwin Wins Point in Rome, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2006, at A12.  
7. The day after the President’s statement, presidential science advisor John Marburger
remarked that “intelligent design is not a scientific concept.”  Charles C. Haynes, First
Amendment Ctr., Inside the First Amendment: Unintelligent Debate over Intelligent Design,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/educate/college/careers/
journalism/firstamendment/8-22-05.htm.
8. For accounts of the Kansas board’s changes in direction, which ultimately led to
physical evidence and information theory, intelligent design theorists maintain
that naturalistic explanations alone cannot account fully for what is observable
in nature, particularly life and its complexity.2  This argument is perceived to
challenge both the modern philosophical premises of scientific exploration,3
and certain views of life’s origins and development embraced by most natural
scientists (especially evolutionary biologists).  If conventional assumptions
about the nature of science comprise the modern machine of the natural
sciences, intelligent design aspires to be the most significant monkey wrench
ever tossed into this machine.
With so much at stake, seemingly everyone has opined on intelligent
design.4  From the Oval Office5 to the Vatican,6 supporters and opponents of
intelligent design appear at every turn.  Further, such “turns” are many.  The
President’s friendly face towards intelligent design was promptly followed by
an official cold shoulder from his science advisor.7  Science standards favoring
the teaching of challenges to evolutionary theory in Kansas public schools
were famously adopted, jettisoned, revised, revived, and further amended in
response to several elections.8  Ohio recently has witnessed a similar
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standards encouraging critiques of prevailing evolutionary theory, see Kenneth Chang,
Evolution and Its Discontents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at F3; Nicholas Riccardi, Vote by
Kansas School Board Favors Evolution’s Doubters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A14; Peter
Slevin, Kansas Education Board First to Back “Intelligent Design”: Schools to Teach Doubts
About Evolutionary Theory, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2005, at A1.  After the most recent change
in the composition of the Kansas State Board of Education, the state’s science guidelines have
been amended to omit any suggestion that important concepts of the theory of evolution are
controversial.  See Josh Keller, State Digest: Another Revolution on Evolution for Kansas
Board, and Other News from the States, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 16, 2007,
http://chronicle.com/daily/2007/02/2007021605n.htm.
9. See Lisa Anderson, Challengers of Evolution Lose: Ohio Board Voters to Remove
“Critical Analysis” in Science Curriculum, a Blow to Creationists, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2006,
at C3.
10. See Michael Powell, Judge Rules Against “Intelligent Design”: Dover, Pa., District
Can’t Teach Evolution Alternative, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A1.
11. 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708-09, 765-66 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (finding a violation of the
Establishment Clause when a school board required biology teachers to read a statement that,
in relevant part, (1) described “Darwin’s Theory of Evolution” as one that is subject to
continuing tests and characterized by evidentiary gaps, (2) informed students that “Intelligent
Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs” from Darwinian evolution, and (3)
referred students to a text that purportedly teaches about intelligent design). 
12. Cf. Lisa Anderson, Darwin’s Theory Evolves into Culture War: Kansas Curriculum Is
Focal Point of Wider Struggle Across Nation, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 2005, § 1, at 1 (reporting that
in the first few months of 2005, “the issue of evolution has sparked at least 21 instances of
controversy on the local and/or state level in at least 18 states”).
13. Kitzmiller does not represent a true test case for teaching intelligent design in the public
school science classroom.  Not only did the policy at issue not call for teaching intelligent
design, but also the book to which students were referred (for an explanation of intelligent
design) apparently does not even accurately articulate intelligent design theory.  Defense expert
Michael Behe testified that he disagreed with the text’s definition of intelligent design.  See
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 744 n.16.  As indicated by the discussion infra Part I.B.2,
Professor Behe is one of the most prominent intelligent design theorists.  How Professor Behe
understands intelligent design is much more probative of what the theory really means than
what a high school textbook says it means.
schizophrenia in the formulation of its public school science standards.9
Equally well known is the changing of the guard of Dover, Pennsylvania’s
local school board, which passed a controversial policy requiring teachers to
notify biology students of the existence of intelligent design.10  The policy
prompted the litigation in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,11 the first
judicial opinion in American history to consider intelligent design theory.
Kitzmiller illustrates that the debate raging over intelligent design has
spread to the board rooms of public secondary schools, and to the communities
that they serve.12  As governmental bodies continue to debate the issues raised
by intelligent design, additional litigation appears inevitable.  Although
Kitzmiller did not involve the actual teaching of intelligent design,13 other
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14. For example, a lawsuit challenging the teaching of intelligent design in California
public schools was filed on January 11, 2006.  Complaint, Hurst v. Newman, No. 06-00012
(E.D. Cal. filed Jan. 11, 2006), available at http://www2.ncseweb.org/hurst/Hurst_v_Newman_
Complaint.pdf; see also Henry Weinstein, 1st Suit in State to Attack “Intelligent Design” Filed,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A1.  The parties settled the case six days after the complaint was
filed, however, and the California school dropped the class as a result of the settlement.  See
Ann Simmons, In Lebec, “Intelligent Design” Class Is History, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at
B1.
15. The legal scholarship discussing the constitutionality of teaching intelligent design in
the public schools is growing.  See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, Storm Clouds on the Horizon of
Darwinism: Teaching the Anthropic Principle and Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 1507 (2002); Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and
the Challenge of Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461 (2003)
[hereinafter Beckwith, Public Education]; Francis J. Beckwith, Science and Religion Twenty
Years After McLean v. Arkansas: Evolution, Public Education, and the New Challenge of
Intelligent Design, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455 (2003) [hereinafter Beckwith, Science and
Religion]; Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s
Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 417 (2006);
Matthew J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest & Steven G. Gey, Is It Science Yet?: Intelligent Design
Creationism and the Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2005); DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest,
supra note 1; Kent Greenawalt, Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism, and
Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321 (2003); H. Wayne House,
Darwinism and the Law: Can Non-Naturalistic Scientific Theories Survive Constitutional
Challenge?, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 355 (2001); Casey Luskin, Alternative Viewpoints About
Biological Origins as Taught in Public Schools, 47 J. CHURCH & ST. 583 (2005); Colin
McRoberts & Timothy Sandefur, Piercing the Veil of Intelligent Design: Why Courts Should
Beware Creationism’s Secular Disguise, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 15 (2005); Jay D. Wexler,
Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools,
56 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2003); Theresa Wilson, Evolution, Creation, and Naturally Selecting
Intelligent Design out of the Public Schools, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 203 (2003); Wendy F.
Hanakahi, Comment, Evolution-Creation Debate: Evaluating the Constitutionality of Teaching
Intelligent Design in Public School Classrooms, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 9 (2002); Stephen L.
Marshall, Note, When May a State Require Teaching Alternatives to the Theory of Evolution?
Intelligent Design as a Test Case, 90 KY. L.J. 743 (2002); T. Mark Mosely, Comment,
Intelligent Design: A Unique Perspective to the Origins Debate, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 327
(2003).  While this literature contributes importantly to an informed understanding of the
constitutional issues, the existing published analyses are far from exhaustive.  
16. The most troublesome portions of Kitzmiller are not essential to its holding.  Indeed,
as discussed below, the holding for the plaintiffs in Kitzmiller is not surprising.  See infra note
367.  For a comprehensive, insightful critique of the judicial analysis of intelligent design and
evolutionary theory in Kitzmiller, see DAVID K. DEWOLF, JOHN G. WEST, CASEY LUSKIN &
JONATHAN WITT, TRAIPSING INTO EVOLUTION: INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND THE KITZMILLER VS.
DOVER DECISION (2006).
cases surely will.14  Consequently, a thoroughly sophisticated analysis of the
constitutional issues raised by the monkey wrench of intelligent design is
essential.15  The need for such an analysis is all the more compelling because
of significant deficiencies in the Kitzmiller opinion.16
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The thesis of this Article is that teaching intelligent design in the public
school science classroom may be constitutionally permissible in some cases,
and that in some cases a decision to forbid the teaching of intelligent design
may be constitutionally impermissible.  This thesis rests upon the position,
advanced and defended in this Article, that intelligent design is properly
viewed as neither an inherently religious conception of origins nor an
“alternative” to much evolutionary theory.  
Insofar as some of the most important constitutional arguments surrounding
intelligent design require a keen appreciation for nuance, a helpful starting
point in advancing the thesis of this Article is to define the terms taking center
stage in the debate.  Without a precise understanding of the vocabulary that
peppers the origins literature, the legal analyst has little hope of reaching a
truly informed constitutional resolution of the dispute.  Thus, Part I.A of this
Article discusses the meaning(s) of evolution and intelligent design.
Moreover, realism dictates that one analyze the constitutional issues raised
by intelligent design in the religious context in which the origins controversy
arose in our country and continues to swell — a land in which the dominant
religious faith is Christianity.  To do so is not to imply any disrespect or
indifference to those who are not of the Christian faith (or of the Jewish faith,
which hallowed Genesis before Christianity ever existed).  Rather,
acknowledging the religious context of the origins debate simply facilitates an
exploration of the real issues of constitutional concern.  The debate about the
constitutionality of teaching intelligent design in the public school science
classroom is unlikely to advance meaningfully until both skeptics and
proponents of teaching intelligent design understand to what degree the theory
coincides with various Christian theological conceptions of origins.  In an
effort to advance the debate, Part I.B explains the major conceptions in
Christian theology of how the physical world came to be.
With this necessary background in place, Part II of this Article surveys the
Supreme Court precedent that guides the constitutional analysis of intelligent
design.  Part II.A briefly discusses the tests that the Supreme Court has
employed in interpreting the Establishment Clause (and its underlying norms),
and Part II.B discusses the two Supreme Court cases involving the teaching of
evolution in public schools.  
Next, Part III thoroughly explores two controversial questions raised by the
prospect of teaching intelligent design in the public school science classroom.
The first question, discussed in Part III.A, is whether intelligent design is
necessarily a “religion” within the meaning of the Establishment Clause, or
whether it inherently consists of “religious” ideas.  Part III.B considers the
second question — whether the discipline of science must refrain from
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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17. See infra Part IV.
18. That this part of the article surveys two “scientific” conceptions of origins does not
imply that the “scientific” nature of each theory is undisputed.  Indeed, the question of whether
intelligent design is inherently unscientific because of its supernatural implications is discussed
infra Part III.B.  The discussion in this part of the article therefore should be understood to
describe two views of origins that purport to be scientific.  Moreover, by devoting this part of
the article to “scientific” theories of origins and Part I.B to “theological” concepts of origins,
I am not assuming that scientific theory and theology never overlap.  Rather, by designating the
concepts in Part I.B as “theological,” I mean only that they articulate a theory of origins that
addresses the involvement (or noninvolvement) of God, explicitly or by implication, upon some
basis that is not limited to evidence observable from nature.
19. See Keith Stewart Thomson, Marginalia: The Meanings of Evolution, 70 AM.
SCIENTIST 529 (1982). 
referring to supernatural causation.  Although this question is plainly
philosophical, it is also constitutionally relevant.17
Finally, Part IV sketches the analysis necessary to answer two crucial
constitutional questions raised by the foregoing discussion.  Part IV.A
discusses under what circumstances the Establishment Clause permits a
governmental body to authorize (or perhaps even require) the teaching of
intelligent design in the public school science classroom.  Next, Part IV.B
explores under what circumstances a governmental body’s decision to prohibit
the teaching of intelligent design may be unconstitutional.
I. Scientific and Theological Conceptions of Origins
A. Two Scientific18 Conceptions of Origins: Evolution and Intelligent
Design
The issues underlying the origins debate have been obfuscated (perhaps, in
some cases, intentionally) by the use of “evolution” without clarification as to
its precise meaning in any given context.  Similarly, “intelligent design” has
been used without an appreciation for what it does, and does not, convey.  This
section provides some much-needed clarity.
1. The Meaning of Evolution
Yale biology professor Keith Thomson has discussed three common
meanings of evolution: (1) change over time; (2) the relationships of
organisms by descent through common ancestry; and (3) an explanatory
mechanism for the pattern and process of the foregoing meanings of evolution
(such as natural selection).19
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20. See Stephen C. Meyer & Michael Newton Keas, The Meanings of Evolution, in
DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 135, 137.
21. See id.
22. According to the late Harvard University Professor Stephen Jay Gould, who was not
an intelligent design supporter, the neo-Darwinian synthesis “is effectively dead, despite its
persistence as textbook orthodoxy.”  Stephen Jay Gould, Is a New and General Theory of
Evolution Emerging?, 6 PALEOBIOLOGY 119, 119-20 (1980).  The “neo-Darwinian synthesis”
joins Darwin’s theory of natural selection with post-Mendellian genetics.  See Christopher
Michael Langan, Cheating the Millennium: The Mounting Explanatory Debts of Scientific
Naturalism, in UNCOMMON DISSENT: INTELLECTUALS WHO FIND DARWINISM UNCONVINCING
233, 235 (William A. Dembski ed., 2004).
23. Gould, supra note 22, at 128-29.  
24. One can probably speak of an even greater number of meanings of evolution.  See, e.g.,
Meyer & Keas, supra note 20, at 136-37 (listing six meanings of evolution discussed in biology
texts).
25. See id. at 136-38. 
26. See id. at 137-38.
27. See id. at 136, 138.  
28. See, e.g., CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL
SELECTION 483-84, 488-89 (London, Murray 1859), available at http://www.esp.org/books/
darwin/origin/facsimile/ (follow “Table of Contents” hyperlink; then follow “XIV.
The first meaning of evolution, change over time, is not necessarily
controversial.  Nature has a history,20 and that history (or portions of it) can
often be discerned through observation.  For example, paleontologists study
changes of animals in the fossil record, and astronomers study the life cycle of
stars.21  The third meaning of evolution — evolution as a mechanism for
producing morphological change — also enjoys widespread support, although
prominent scientists (including those who reject intelligent design)22 dispute
the degree to which natural selection acting on random genetic variations and
mutations can produce significant variations within a population.23
The second meaning of evolution identified by Professor Thomson requires
refinement.24  “Descent through common ancestry” can mean two types of
evolution.  The first is “limited common descent,” the notion that particular
groups of organisms (species or perhaps even higher classifications, such as
genera or families) have descended from a common ancestor.25  The Galapagos
Island finches made famous by Charles Darwin illustrate probable common
descent from a single South American finch species,26 and recognition of this
common descent is widespread.
More controversial is the second type of descent through common
ancestry — “universal common descent,” which holds that all living organisms
have descended from a common ancestor or an extremely small number of
ancestors.27  Universal common descent is one important feature of Darwinian
evolution.28  Darwin’s view has been described as “monophyletic” because it
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Recapitulation and Conclusion” hyperlink). 
29. See Meyer & Keas, supra note 20, at 138.  Strictly speaking, Darwin did not insist that
all life evolved from only one living organism; he allowed for five progenitors in each of the
animal and plant kingdoms.  See DARWIN, supra note 28, at 484.
30. Meyer & Keas, supra note 20, at 139.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See G.A. KERKUT, IMPLICATIONS OF EVOLUTION 157 (1960).
35. Id. 
36. Some may prefer to separate these inquiries entirely.  However, insofar as intelligent
design advocates have argued that intelligent design is necessary to explain both life’s origins
and its development, this article will frequently refer simply to the “origins debate.”
37. See infra Part III.B.
claims that all organisms ultimately form one large family.29  The view
postulates almost “unbounded biological change.”30  Several modern
biologists — including those not associated with the intelligent design
movement — reject Darwin’s monophyletic view of life.  They prefer a
polyphyletic view of life’s history, which understands the present diversity of
organisms to have arisen from separate ancestral lines.31  Adherents of this
view cite evidence from paleontology, embryology, biochemistry, and
molecular biology.32  Although one can embrace evolution as a mechanism for
change (the third major sense of evolution identified above) and be either a
monophyletic or a polyphyletic evolutionist, it appears that polyphyletic
evolutionists generally believe that natural selection as a mechanism for
change has a more limited role than do their more purely Darwinian
counterparts.33
To these biological meanings of evolution must be added the “general
theory of evolution.”34  Under this theory, “all the living forms in the world
have arisen from a single source which itself came from an inorganic form.”35
Thus, one may speak of the origins debate as addressing both the “origin of
life” and the “origin of species.”36 
Finally, there are at least three other meanings of evolution worthy of
identification — evolutionary creationism, deistic evolution and atheistic
evolution.  These versions of evolutionary theory combine one or more of the
above senses of evolution with a theory of the involvement (or absence of the
involvement) of God.  Although, as argued below, tidy and supposedly
impermeable distinctions between “theological” and “scientific” conceptions
of origins break down in some instances,37 this article will discuss these final
types of evolutionary theory with other theological conceptions of origins. 
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38. William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse, General Introduction to DEBATING DESIGN,
supra note 1, at 3, 3.
39. Angus Menuge, Who’s Afraid of ID?, in DEBATING DESIGN, supra note 1, at 32, 32.
40. Id.
41.  William A. Dembski, Introduction: Mere Creation, in MERE CREATION, supra note 1,
at 13, 17 (“Intelligent design properly formulated is a theory of information.”); Menuge, supra
note 39, at 32.
42. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE
TO EVOLUTION 117-39 (1996).
43. For a concise explanation of Dr. Behe’s argument relying upon irreducible complexity,
2. The Meaning of Intelligent Design
Professors William Dembski and Michael Ruse, an advocate and opponent
of intelligent design, respectively, define and summarize intelligent design as
follows:
[It is] the hypothesis that in order to explain life it is necessary to
suppose the action of an unevolved intelligence.  One simply cannot
explain organisms, those living and those long gone, by reference to
normal natural causes or material mechanisms, be these
straightforwardly evolutionary or a consequence of evolution . . . .
[I]t is not necessarily the case that a commitment to Intelligent
Design implies a commitment to a personal God or indeed to any
God that would be acceptable to the world’s major religions.  The
claim is simply that there must be something more than ordinary
natural causes or material mechanisms, and moreover, that
something must be intelligent and capable of bringing about
organisms.38
Like Darwinism, intelligent design scholars study the apparent design of the
natural world.  Unlike Darwinism, advocates of intelligent design “claim[] that
the best explanation for at least some of the appearance of design in nature is
that this design is actual.”39  Intelligent design maintains that intelligent causes
can and do leave “empirically detectable marks in the natural world.”40
Specifically, some forms of complex information appearing in the natural
world suggest the activity of intelligent agency.41
More precisely, intelligent design theorists have argued, first, that certain
biological systems, such as the immune system, are irreducibly complex.42
Because all of the components of the system must be present in order for it to
function, the incremental changes contemplated by the Darwinian mechanism
are extremely unlikely to produce the final product; “transitional” versions of
the system would be non-functional, and therefore should not survive the
evolutionary process.43  More generally, intelligent design theorists have
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see Michael J. Behe, Design in the Details: The Origin of Biomolecular Machines, in
DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 287.  For critiques of Dr. Behe’s
arguments, see, for example, David Depew, Intelligent Design and Irreducible Complexity: A
Rejoinder, in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 441; and BRUCE
H. WEBER, Biochemical Complexity: Emergence or Design?, in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 455. 
44. See Menuge, supra note 39, at 47. 
45. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, NO FREE LUNCH: WHY SPECIFIED COMPLEXITY
CANNOT BE PURCHASED WITHOUT INTELLIGENCE (2002); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN
INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998).
46. For a relatively concise explanation of specified complexity, see William A. Dembski,
Reinstating Design Within Science, in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra
note 1, at 403 [hereinafter Dembski, Reinstating Design]; and William A. Dembski, The Logical
Underpinnings of Intelligent Design, in DEBATING DESIGN, supra note 1, at 311.  For a critique
of Dr. Dembski’s arguments, see, for example, Branden Fitelson, Christopher Stephens &
Elliott Sober, How Not to Detect Design — Critical Notice: William A. Dembski, the Design
Inference, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 1, at 597; and
Peter Godfrey-Smith, Information and the Argument from Design, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN
CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 1, at 575.
47. See Dembski, supra note 41, at 17 (“Intelligent design is theologically minimalist.  It
detects intelligence without speculating about the nature of the intelligence.”).
48. See Dembski & Ruse, supra note 38, at 3.
49. Although many advocates of intelligent design are Christian, see id., some are not.
Indeed, at least one prominent scientist associated with intelligent design (Michael Denton) is
agnostic.  See Menuge, supra note 39, at 35.  Those theists associated with the movement are
a diverse group, including the faithful of Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and
the Unification Church (the followers of the Reverend Moon).  See House, supra note 15, at
402-03.
argued that many cases of complex specified information in nature, of which
irreducible complexity is but one example,44 point to intelligent design.45  The
basic idea, an application of probability and statistical theory, is that intelligent
agency can be detected when an improbable (i.e., complex) outcome conforms
to a pattern (i.e., specification).46
Intelligent design is in many respects both modest (i.e., of limited
ambition)47 and diverse (with respect to the views of its proponents).  It
confines itself to the basic question of whether material forces alone can
account for the origin and development of life; it does not engage in tangential
speculations.  For example, intelligent design theory does not attempt to
discover the nature of the intelligent agent of design.48  Thus, the question of
whether the designer is anything like the God revealed in any religious text is
neither explored nor assumed.49  Moreover, advocates of intelligent design are
not uniform in their estimation of the positive explanatory power of evolution.
Some supporters of intelligent design believe that the designing agent “works
in tandem with a limited form of evolution, perhaps even Darwinian
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50. See Dembski & Ruse, supra note 38, at 3.
51. See BEHE, supra note 42, at 5.
52. Id.
53. According to the opinion, intelligent design “posits that animals did not evolve
naturally through evolutionary means but were created abruptly by a nonnatural, or
supernatural, designer.”  Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 736 (M.D.
Pa. 2005).  In support of his finding, Judge Jones cites the testimony of intelligent design
theorist Michael Behe that it is “implausible that the designer is a natural entity.”  Id.  That the
court cites Behe for the assertion that “animals did not evolve naturally” is terribly ironic, given
that Behe has publicly embraced much evolutionary theory.  Professor’s Behe’s whole argument
is not that evolution served no significant role in the development of life, but that it did not
serve as the exclusive role in such development.  See BEHE, supra note 42.
54. See Dembski, supra note 41, at 19 (“Intelligent design is logically compatible with
everything from utterly discontinuous creation . . . to the most far-ranging evolution (e.g., God
seamlessly melding all organisms together into one great tree of life).”).
55. See, e.g., Stephen C. Meyer, Marcus Ross, Paul Nelson & Paul Chien, The Cambrian
Explosion: Biology’s Big Bang, in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note
1, at 323, 337-54 (arguing that evolutionary theories of macroevolution fail to account for the
appearance of phyla in the Cambrian fossil record).
56. See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN 252 (1999) (stating that intelligent
design can accommodate evolutionary change to any extent).
evolution,” whereas others deny evolution any role except, perhaps, in “lower
taxonomic levels.”50  Indeed, one leading intelligent design theorist,
biochemistry professor Michael Behe, considers the theory of common descent
“fairly convincing,” and has “no particular reason to doubt it.”51  Behe also
acknowledges that natural selection “might explain many things.”52
3. The Relationship Between Evolution and Intelligent Design
The foregoing discussion should make clear that scientific conceptions of
evolution and scientific conceptions of intelligent design are not entirely
incompatible.  Evolutionary theory does not necessarily refute the presence of
an intelligent agent.  Moreover, notwithstanding Judge Jones’s misleading
suggestion to the contrary in Kitzmiller,53 intelligent design theory does not
require a rejection of any, let alone all, of the various meanings of evolution.54
What distinguishes intelligent design from evolutionary theory is the former’s
insistence that the origin and development of life cannot be explained
exclusively by natural causes.  Granted, some theorists who embrace intelligent
design also minimize the role of natural selection in the development of
species.55  But to accept intelligent design is not to reject the whole, or
(necessarily) even much, of evolutionary theory.56  Rather, intelligent design
essentially challenges the sufficiency of evolutionary theory to account
entirely for the development (and origin) of life. 
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57. A “theological” conception of origins within the meaning of this article is one that
speaks to the involvement (or noninvolvement) of God, explicitly or by implication, upon some
basis that is not limited to evidence observable from nature.  Views associated with religions
that posit God’s involvement (or the absence of the involvement of God or any god) are
theological under this definition. 
58. Genesis 1:1-2:25.
59.  AL-QUR’AN 41:9-21 (Ahmed Ali trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2001).  
60. See BARBARA C. SPROUL, PRIMAL MYTHS: CREATION MYTHS AROUND THE WORLD
179-92 (1979).
61. See id. at 199-205.
62. See id. at 232-86.
63. See id. at 31-76.
64. See generally SPROUL, supra note 60 (discussing creation myths around the world).
65. See, e.g., Jeanne Anderson, The Revolution Against Evolution, or “Well, Darwin, We’re
Not in Kansas Anymore,” 29 J.L. & EDUC. 398, 403 (2000) (arguing that, “since evolution and
the big bang theory are particularly opposed by fundamentalist Christians,” a state’s decision
not to test students on such subjects confers direct benefits on a certain sect); Stephanie L.
Shemin, The Potential Constitutionality of Intelligent Design?, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 621,
664 (2005) (“[E]ver since Darwin proposed his theory of natural selection, there has been a rift
between scientific research and religious doctrine, notably among biologists who accept the
theory of evolution and Christian fundamentalists who do not.”); Randall W. Hall, Note,
Unnatural Selection: The Fundamentalist Crusade Against Evolution and the New Strategies
to Discredit Darwin, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 168 (2006) (stating that “the opposition
to the theory of evolution emerges from the small sector of fundamentalist Christians in
America who argue that the Biblical account of creation found in the book of Genesis is the
only correct origin story”); id. at 179 (“Fundamentalists have also sought to stifle the teaching
of evolution by arguing that belief in evolution constitutes religion.”); id. at 186
(“Fundamentalists now cloak their disgust for evolution in theories such as Intelligent
Design . . . .”); Lisa D. Kirkpatrick, Note, Forgetting the Lessons of History: The Evolution of
Creationism and Current Trends to Restrict the Teaching of Evolution in Public Schools, 49
DRAKE L. REV. 125, 142 (2000) (characterizing evolution as “the very theory that directly
B. Theological Conceptions57 of Origins
Many religions purport to explain the origins of the universe, including
biological life.  Creation stories appear not only in Genesis58 — a foundational
canonical text in Judaism and Christianity — but also in sacred texts, hymns,
and oral traditions of Islam,59 Hinduism,60 Taoism,61 Native American
religions,62 and Native African religions,63 among others.  One or more gods
figure prominently in numerous creation stories.64 
In the United States, of course, the oft-perceived tension between
theological and scientific explanations for the origin of life is historically
rooted in certain interpretations of the book of Genesis.  Indeed, many who
support teaching evolutionary theory in public schools without qualification
appear to attribute all or most of the skepticism toward such teaching to the
“Christian fundamentalist” interpretation of Genesis, whatever that phrase
means.65  Unfortunately, those who are among the most informed about the
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conflicts with the Biblical version of creation and that has historically been opposed by
Christian fundamentalists”). 
XXIn fact, it is not clear that a distinctly Christian “fundamentalist” interpretation of Genesis
exists.  Fundamentalists are often charged with embracing a “literal” interpretation of Genesis.
Several distinct interpretations of Genesis, however, may fairly be characterized as “literal,” and
they have very different implications when harmonizing science and Scripture.  Moreover, the
term “fundamentalist” is terribly misused in discussing the origins controversy.  Cf. STEPHEN
L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 169 (1993) (referring to the “certainly misleading use
of the term ‘fundamentalist’” in the controversy surrounding creationism and science instruction
in the public schools).
66. See Genesis 1:1, 3-10.
67. See id. 1:1-27, 2:7-25.
68. See id. 1:5, 8, 13, 19, 23, 31. 
body of constitutional law bearing upon the origins debate are not necessarily
equally informed about the precise theological views at issue.  The proper
resolution of the constitutional issues raised by intelligent design is unlikely
to occur without a more illuminated comprehension of the major theological
conceptions of life’s origins and development. 
This section sketches the theological framework for understanding the
origins debate.  First, this part discusses Biblically based theological
conceptions of origins in an attempt to summarize the exegetical debate
concerning two difficulties encountered by interpreters of the Bible, and to
discuss how these debates relate to broader conceptions of origins in Christian
theology.  Next, this part examines two theological positions on origins that
are not grounded in Biblical theology.  This discussion of the myriad
theological positions on origins informs the legal questions raised by teaching
intelligent design in the public schools.
1. Biblically Based Theological Conceptions of Origins
a) Interpretations of the Biblical Text
As most legal scholars addressing the origins debate are aware, Genesis
states that God created the heavens and the earth.66  Also of common
knowledge to many is Genesis’s account that God created light, the sky, land,
oceans, the stars (including the sun), the moon, plant and animal life, and
human beings.67  Finally, God is said to have completed His creation in six
“days.”68  These statements may well exhaust many legal analysts’ depth of
knowledge of the Biblical creation texts.  The precise meaning of the first two
chapters of Genesis, however, has eluded scholars for centuries.
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69. In the Old Testament, the Creator-God is identified as Yahweh.  See, e.g., id. 2:4.  The
New Testament identifies the pre-incarnate Christ (God the Son) as the one through whom God
made the universe.  See John 1:1-3, 10, 15; Colossians 1:13-17; Hebrews 1:1-3. 
70. Genesis 1:1-3 (New American Standard Bible).
71. For a scholarly discussion of these views, including a brief analysis of the most
important Hebrew terms in the text, see ALLEN P. ROSS, CREATION AND BLESSING: A GUIDE TO
THE STUDY AND EXPOSITION OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS 103-08, 718-23 (1988).
72. See, e.g., 1 H. C. LEUPOLD, EXPOSITION OF GENESIS 39-42 (1942).
73. Creation ex nihilo is creation “from nothing.”
74. See ROSS, supra note 71, at 718.  In other words, this view understands Genesis 1 to
describe a single creation from beginning to end.
75. According to ROSS, supra note 71, at 718-19, the first edition of the Scofield Reference
Bible advances this view.  See generally THE SCOFIELD REFERENCE BIBLE (Cyrus Ingerson
Scofield ed., 1909).  The view was first popularized by Thomas Chalmers of Scotland in 1814
and has been embraced by several others.  See CHARLES C. RYRIE, BASIC THEOLOGY 209
(1999).
76. See, e.g., Isaiah 45; Jeremiah 4:23-26; Ezekiel 28.
Of course, the text is clear that God is the creator.69  But specifying the time
and manner of the creation of the universe is a much more difficult matter.
There are two particularly difficult interpretive questions.
The first question concerns the meaning of the first three verses of Genesis
1:
[1] In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.  [2]
And the earth was formless and void, and darkness was over the
surface of the deep; and the Spirit of God was moving over the
surface of the waters.  [3] Then God said, “Let there be light”; and
there was light.70
There are several major interpretations of these verses, all of which attempt to
explain the relationship between the clauses in verse 2 and the entirety of verse
1.71  Although numerous variations of these interpretations exist, four major
views can be identified.  
Under one view, verse 1 refers to the first part of the first day of creation
discussed in Genesis 1:3-5.72  According to this view, the “creation” of verse
1 is ex nihilo.73  This view also reads the clauses of Genesis 1:2 to refer to the
state of the earth immediately following the creation of the universe ex nihilo
but before the creative acts recorded in the remainder of Genesis 1.74
A second major view also takes the creation of verse 1 to be ex nihilo.75
This view, however, holds that the creation of verse 1 refers to an original,
perfect creation distinct from the creation account beginning with verse 3 (i.e.,
a creation distinct from the universe as we now know it).  Under this view, the
state of the earth in verse 2 — formless and void — describes a condition
resulting from the fall of Satan,76 which brought God’s judgment of chaos
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77. Strong exegetical arguments support the view that the earth’s condition of being
“formless and void” is a result of divine judgment.  See ROSS, supra note 71, at 106-07, 722.
78. See id. at 719.  For a critique of this “reconstruction” (also known as “gap” or
“restitution”) theory, see Mark F. Rooker, Genesis 1:1-3: Creation or Re-Creation?: Part 1, 149
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 316, 317-18 (1992).
79. See Gary G. Cohen, Hermeneutical Principles and Creation Theories, 5 GRACE J. 17,
25 (1964).
80. See id.
81. See ROSS, supra note 71, at 719-20.
82. GERHARD VON RAD, GENESIS: A COMMENTARY 49-51 (John H. Marks trans., 1972).
83. See ROSS, supra note 71, at 720-23.
84. Texts other than Genesis support God’s creation ex nihilo.  See, e.g., John 1:3; Hebrews
11:3.
85. For a critique of this view, see Mark F. Rooker, Genesis 1:1-3: Creation or Re-
Creation?: Part 2, 149 BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 411 (1992).
86. For a discussion of four of these views, see RYRIE, supra note 75, at 211-13.  For a
discussion of theologians who have embraced each view, see Cohen, supra note 79, at 25-27.
upon the earth.77  Verse 3 thus describes the first step of God’s reconstruction,
or recreation, of the earth that had been judged.78
A third view moderates between the first two interpretations.  Under this
reading of Genesis 1, the first verse of the chapter indeed refers to creation ex
nihilo, but with a vast gap of time between either the first two verses or the
second and third verses.79  Unlike the second view, verse 2 is not read to
suggest judgment.  The six creative days are thought to begin with either verse
2 or verse 3.80
A fourth view (of which several variations exist) holds that Genesis 1:1
does not refer to creation ex nihilo.81  One significant variation of this view,
which partially builds upon the exposition of Genesis by the German scholar
Gerhard von Rad,82 understands Genesis 1:1 to summarize the detailed account
of creation in the remainder of Genesis 1.  Genesis 1:2 records the state of the
earth immediately before God spoke the recreated universe — the universe as
we know it — into existence.  This state of the earth, as under the second view
discussed above, resulted from God’s judgment following the fall of Satan.
Unlike the second view, however, this view places Satan’s fall not between
verses 1 and 2, but sometime prior to the creation account of Genesis 1.83
Although this view accepts an initial creation of a universe by God,84 it does
not find any explicit record of it in Genesis 1.  Genesis 1 simply describes
God’s reshaping of the judged (initial) universe into what we now know as our
universe.85
The second major interpretive question that has proved extremely
significant is the meaning of “day,” and the periods of time marked by each
“day,” as the term is used throughout Genesis 1.  Several views exist.86  One
view holds that each day is a twenty-four hour period, uninterrupted by
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
542 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:527
87. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 71, at 109.
88. See, e.g., GLEASON L. ARCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIBLE DIFFICULTIES 58-63 (1982).
The Hebrew term that is translated “day” in English is transliterated “yom.”  Yom can refer to
an extended period of time.  See ROSS, supra note 71, at 108-09 (discussing, but not adopting,
this meaning of yom).
89. This view is described, but not endorsed, by Charles Ryrie.  See RYRIE, supra note 75,
at 211.
90. See, e.g., BERNARD RAMM, THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF SCIENCE AND SCRIPTURE 226-29
(1954).  Some also describe a similar notion, the “framework hypothesis,” which argues that the
days embody a literary device, rather than a chronology.  See Robert C. Newman, Progressive
Creationism, in THREE VIEWS ON CREATION AND EVOLUTION 103, 105 (J.P. Moreland & John
Mark Reynolds eds., 1999) (describing, but not adopting, the framework hypothesis).
91. Simply stated, hermeneutics is “the science (principles) and art (task) by which the
meaning of the biblical text is determined.”  ROY B. ZUCK, BASIC BIBLE INTERPRETATION 19
(1991).  Hermeneutics is prior to exegesis, the determination of the meaning of a text.  See id.
at 19-22.
92. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 24-27.  The literary-historical method seeks to understand
both the language and the culture of the world in which the Biblical author lived.  See D.P.
Fuller, History of Interpretation, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BIBLE ENCYCLOPEDIA
863, 864 (Geoffrey W. Bromiley et al. eds., 1982).  For a defense of the literary-historical
method, see id. at 872-74.
93. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 27 (criticizing the mythological view).
additional periods of time.  Thus, this view maintains that the creation
described in Genesis 1:3-31 occurred over six solar days as we currently
experience them.87  A second view, known as the “day-age” view, posits that
each day represents a long period of time, even a geological age.88  A third
theory, sometimes identified as the “intermittent-day” view, is that each day
of Genesis refers to a solar day, but long periods of time elapsed between
successive “days.”89  A fourth position, known as the “revelatory-day” view,
holds that each day refers not to the time during which God created the
universe and life forms, but to the time during which God revealed His
creative work to Moses (the author of the Pentateuch).90
The foregoing attempts to answer these two interpretive questions are
consistent with what may be characterized as “literal” hermeneutics91 (or,
perhaps more accurately, “literary-historical,” or “literary-grammatical-
historical” hermeneutics).92  A nonliteral interpretation of Genesis 1 requires
a much less rigorous analysis of the terms and grammar of Genesis 1.  A
common nonliteral interpretation of Genesis 1 is that it is merely a creation
myth or an allegory, intended not to be historically accurate, but instead to
communicate religious truth.93
The purpose of summarizing these various interpretations of Genesis is not
to evaluate their merits; thus, this Article will refrain from analyzing the
exegetical strengths and weaknesses of each position.  Rather, the purpose of
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94. Dr. Ryrie is characteristic in describing the view discussed in the text accompanying
this note as theistic evolution.  See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 196-97.  He obviously does not
subscribe to this view.  See id.  For critiques of evolutionary creationism, see, for example,
David H. Lane, Theological Problems with Theistic Evolution, 151 BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 155
(1994).
95. Cf. Howard J. Van Till, The Fully Gifted Creation, in THREE VIEWS ON CREATION AND
EVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 159, 161, 172 (stating that he has occasionally styled his view
as “evolving creation”).  From the perspective of a theologian who embraces both the Biblical
doctrine that God is the creator who brought everything else into being and the scientific
evidence for the evolution of life on earth from simplistic life forms to complex organisms, the
term “theistic evolution” improperly emphasizes the process  —  evolution — rather than the
One who conceived, oversaw, and implemented the process — God.  See id.  Because an
adherent of these two positions accepts God’s role in creation as primary in two senses —
chronologically and diachronically — I believe the position should be styled so as to convey
that it is a form of creationism.
96. See J.P. Moreland & John Mark Reynolds, Introduction to THREE VIEWS ON CREATION
AND EVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 7, 24-25.
97. See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 196-97.
98. Van Till, supra note 95, at 173.
99. See, e.g., id. at 170-71.
surveying these competing views is to lay the groundwork for understanding
the textual bases underlying the various theological conceptions of the nature
of God’s creative activity.  This Article now turns to these various theological
schools of thought.
b) Theological Conceptions of the Nature of God’s Creative Work in
Genesis
One theological position on the Genesis creation account is often called
“theistic evolution,”94 although the term “evolutionary creationism” more
accurately captures the essence of the view.95  Evolutionary creationism
embraces the scientific consensus that complex organisms evolved from
simple life forms through mutations and natural selection.96  Further,
evolutionary creationism posits that God extensively used, and even directed,
the process of naturalistic evolution in creating.97  As one thoughtful
evolutionary creationist explains, this view embraces a “concept of a creation
that has been equipped by God with all of the capabilities that are necessary
to make possible the evolutionary development now envisioned by the natural
sciences.”98 
Evolutionary creationism holds to the Biblical view of God as the creator
and sustainer of the universe.99  It simply interprets the Genesis account to set
forth what may be described as a purely providential — as opposed to a
miraculous or interventionist — picture of how God created the heavens and
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100. Cf. id. at 185-92 (rejecting the view that God miraculously “intervened” at various
stages of creation in favor of the view that God conceptualized and magnificently “gifted” the
universe with the capacity to evolve into its current state). 
101. See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 196.
102. See David H. Lane, Special Creation or Evolution: No Middle Ground, 151
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 11, 14 (1994).
103. See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 196.
104. See Van Till, supra note 95, at 243-44.
105. See, e.g., Paul Nelson & John Mark Reynolds, Young Earth Creationism, in THREE
VIEWS ON CREATION AND EVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 39, 42, 51-53.
106. See, e.g., id. at 44 (distinguishing recent and progressive creationists on the basis that
the latter “tend to view the days of creation as long periods of time”).
107. See, e.g., id. at 49-50, 73.
108. See, e.g., id. at 42.
109. See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 214.
110. See Nelson & Reynolds, supra note 105, at 42.
the earth.100  Evolutionary creationists may embrace the day-age view of
Genesis 1,101 or view the passage as a creation myth.102  Further, under their
view, the creation is a product of God’s design (as indicated in Genesis 1), but
the evolutionary development of the creation did not require that God act
through means other than the natural processes that He conceived.103
Evolutionary creationism accepts the Biblical view that God interacts with His
creation; it simply posits that, after God conceived of and “gifted” His creation
with the capacity to develop, His additional acts upon His creation occurred
through those natural processes that He initially created, rather than through
extrinsic processes.104 
Whereas evolutionary creationism may rightly be described as fully
compatible with all current scientific data, the Biblically based theological
conception of origins that is in the greatest tension with current scientific data
(or, at least, with broadly held interpretations of such data) is “young-earth”
(or “recent”) creationism.  Young-earth creationism holds that God directly
created all life on earth (and even the entire cosmos) during the creation week
of Genesis 1 and 2.105  The days are typically taken to be solar days.106
Coupled with the genealogies set forth in Genesis, this view deduces that the
universe is of much more recent origin than what is widely believed today.107
Young-earth creationists believe that the flood of Noah was not only historical,
but also global.108  The global flood is hypothesized to have produced the fossil
record.109  Young-earth creationists also believe that “[t]he curse of Genesis
3:14-19 profoundly affected every aspect of the natural economy.”110  Thus,
all natural evil — including the death of animals — is attributable to the sin of
man in the Garden of Eden.  Major institutional advocates of the young-earth
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111. See id. at 42-43.
112. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 90, at 105.
113. See, e.g., id. at 105-06.
114. See, e.g., id. at 106.
115. See, e.g., John Jefferson Davis, Response to Robert C. Newman, in THREE VIEWS ON
CREATION AND EVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 137, 137-40.
116. See Newman, supra note 90, at 107.
117. See, e.g., id. at 107-08.
118. See id. at 106.
119. See id. (describing the restoration of the earth as having occurred in “six literal days”).
position include the Creation Research Society, the Geoscience Research
Institute, and the Institute for Creation Research.111
If evolutionary creationism is at one end of the spectrum of compatibility
with the current interpretation of scientific data by most scientists, and young-
earth creationism is at the other end, somewhere between the two is
“progressive” (or “old earth”) creationism.  Progressive creationism also holds
that God directly created the cosmos and life on earth, but that the earth, and
indeed the entire universe, are old (even billions of years old).112  Progressive
creationists typically believe that God used “some combination of supernatural
intervention and providential guidance” to create the universe.113  They posit
that God created all else that exists progressively, over long periods of time.114
At least some progressive creationists appear willing to recognize the presence
of some transitional species in the fossil record.115  Although there are
variations of progressive creationism, they all appear to adopt one of the
various interpretations of “days” in Genesis that do not result in a creation
week of six solar days for the entire universe.116  Some of these views produce
a rather striking correlation between the Genesis creation account and the
broad understandings of Earth’s origins proposed by modern geology and
astronomy.117
Creationists who argue for (1) an original creation (either described in
Genesis 1:1 or elsewhere in Scripture) distinct from the universe as we now
know it, and (2) a creation week of six solar days for the universe (as we now
know it), are not, strictly speaking, progressive creationists.118  They may
appropriately be called “reconstructive creationists.”  Unlike progressive
creationists, reconstructive creationists do not interpret the bulk of Genesis 1
to advance a chronology of eras coinciding with the geological timetable.119
This observation does not mean, however, that reconstructive creationists
necessarily reject modern methods of dating the universe.  Their view of an
original creation, later judged by God, is consistent with a very old earth, even
one created over billions of years ago.  Further, their view of an original
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120. See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 208-09.
121. See Del Ratzsch, Design, Chance & Theistic Evolution, in MERE CREATION, supra note
1, at 289, 300 (explaining that theistic evolution “can readily incorporate design that tracks back
(continuously) to primordial conditions or to the ultimate structuring of natural laws and
principles”).
122. See id. (“Thus where design theory potentially differs from theistic evolution will be
precisely in the potential for explanatory appeals to design of a sort that requires intervention
into cosmic history.”).
creation much older than the “re-created” or “restored” planet allows for much
modern interpretation of the data produced by the fossil record.120
c) Summary: The Relationship Between Intelligent Design, Evolution,
and Biblically Based Theological Conceptions of Origins
The foregoing discussion compels the conclusion that Biblically based
theological conceptions of origins are best conceptualized along a spectrum,
rather than in distinct compartments.  The spectrum represents the degree to
which God is thought to be directly involved in the creative process (i.e., the
degree to which God acts miraculously or by other forms of intervention,
rather than providentially through nature).  The degree of correspondence
between a theological conception of origin and scientific conceptions of
origins depends upon where the former falls along the spectrum.
 At one end of the spectrum is young-earth creationism.  Because of its very
short creative period, and its view of a recent earth, young-earth creationism
must be considered largely inconsistent with evolutionary theory; it certainly
seems to leave no room for significant macroevolutionary development of life.
Although young-earth creationism is consistent with the existence of an
intelligent agent, it goes far beyond the views of intelligent design theorists
(several of whom hold views inconsistent with young-earth creationism). 
At the other end of the spectrum is evolutionary creationism.  Evolutionary
creationism accommodates widespread evolutionary development, and in its
pure form (theoretically, at least) could even tolerate the origin of life through
natural means.  Evolutionary creationism could also embrace the “designer”
of intelligent design, but it posits a different role for the designer than that
contemplated by intelligent design theory.121  To the evolutionary creationist,
God acts exclusively (or almost exclusively) through processes that are
plausibly explainable solely in natural terms, rather than through events of
design (throughout the course of nature’s history) that are necessary to effect
an outcome that nature would not have taken without some intelligent
direction.122  Moreover, and counterintuitively, for many evolutionary
creationists, God could be much more active than the designer of intelligent
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123. See id. at 310 n.4 (“Many theistic evolutionists claim that God upholds all things at
every instance and that laws describe his usual ways of dealing with the cosmos.”).
124. Neither does intelligent design refute such a role for the designer, of course.
125. See Dembski, supra note 41, at 17 (“[I]ntelligent design presupposes neither a creator
nor miracles.”).  For an explanation of why design theory involves “a hands-on directing” but
not necessarily a “gap” in natural laws, see Ratzsch, supra note 121, at 290-302.  
126. See Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Evolution, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BIBLE
design.123  Evolutionary creationism is consistent with the view that God is
constantly and purposefully acting through the natural world that He has
created; intelligent design requires no such constancy in the role of the
designer.124
Progressive creationism and reconstructive creationism can accommodate
a great deal of evolutionary development, as well as the direct activity of an
intelligent agent.  Progressive creationists typically believe that God created
the universe and life in part through supernatural acts, which is consistent with
intelligent design.  Some progressive creationists also accept the probability
of substantial evolutionary development of organisms.  Similarly, there is
nothing inherent in reconstructive creationism that requires a rejection of
significant evolutionary development.  In theory, the “original” creation
contemplated by reconstructive creationists could have witnessed considerable
evolution.
Finally, neither evolution nor intelligent design requires the adoption of any
“creationist” view described herein.  Evolutionary theory does not speak to
God’s role in creation.  Further, three of the creationist views described herein
clearly do not require a rejection of evolutionary theory (at least not most of
it).  Only young-earth creationism appears incompatible with significant
evolutionary development of organisms.  Neither does intelligent design
necessarily correspond to any Biblical account of creation.  Intelligent design
deduces intelligent agency, but not one that must fit a Christian conception of
a creator.  Indeed, the agent of design need not (though it could) work outside
of natural laws (i.e., miraculously).125
2. Non-Biblically Based Theological Conceptions of Origins
Two important theological views of origins that are not compatible with any
plausible interpretation of the Biblical account of creation are deistic evolution
and atheistic evolution.  Deistic evolution posits the existence of God, but has
little else in common with any form of creationism.  Deistic evolution
understands God to have created the universe so that natural processes
occurring subsequent to the original creation exclusively have caused the
extensive development of all life forms, unaided (or substantially unaided)
through time by further divine activity.126  It appears that Charles Darwin was
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ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 92, at 212.
127. In a letter to Asa Gray dated May 22, 1860, Darwin wrote that he was “inclined to look
at everything as resulting from designed laws,” with all details “left to the working out of what
we may call chance.”  VERNON BLACKMORE & ANDREW PAGE, EVOLUTION: THE GREAT
DEBATE 118 (1989).  
128. See, e.g., JACQUES MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY 112-13 (1971) (attributing all
innovations of evolution to chance alone).
129.  Observe that atheistic evolution does not necessarily subsume atheism, the belief that
there is no God.  In the sense I am using the term, it is evolution that is thought to be without
God, not necessarily the whole of reality.  Of course, an evolutionist who is an atheist would
endorse atheistic evolution.  My point is simply that, in theory, one can believe in God and yet
embrace atheistic evolution, because theism does not necessarily require the belief that God is
to any degree responsible for creating the material world.
theologically at most a deistic evolutionist, at least when he wrote the first
edition of On the Origin of Species.127
What may be called atheistic evolution holds that materialistic, evolutionary
processes solely account for all life forms.128  Whereas deistic evolution allows
for a creator as first cause, atheistic evolution does not.  Atheistic evolution
does not merely say that natural processes were involved in the evolution of
life.  Rather, atheistic evolution boldly proclaims that only natural processes
account for life’s origins and development.  Atheistic evolution is a theological
conception of origins because it takes a position, explicitly or implicitly, on
whether God is in any sense responsible for the origin and development of life,
notwithstanding that the position can never be verified merely from observing
nature.129
For purposes of constitutional law, the most important reason to identify
and define deistic and atheistic evolution is to ensure that they are recognized
as theological conceptions of origins.  A high school science teacher who
advocates atheistic evolution, for example, is promoting a theological position
just as surely as is his counterpart across the hallway who opines that God
created all life forms through evolutionary processes.  Under the Constitution,
the state has no more business advancing non-Biblically based theologies of
life’s origins and development than it has advancing Christian conceptions of
the same.  This point should be obvious to anyone even modestly familiar with
the relevant Supreme Court precedent.  The next part of this Article reviews
the most important Supreme Court case law bearing upon this subject.
II. Relevant Supreme Court Precedent Interpreting the Establishment
Clause
Under the first clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
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130. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
131. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1940) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Free Exercise Clause).
132. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(observing that many recent decisions of the Court do not apply the Lemon test). 
133. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
134. Indeed, as of the date that the Supreme Court decided its second case involving the
teaching of evolution in the public schools, the Lemon test had been applied in all but one case.
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987).  The one exception was Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983), which upheld the Nebraska legislature’s practice of
having a state-funded chaplain open each legislative session with prayer.
135. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 613.
138. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-61 (1985) (invalidating Alabama’s moment of
silence statute that was designed to give children an opportunity to pray at school); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating a Kentucky statute that required
the posting of the Ten Commandments on public school walls). 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”130  This constitutional text,
consisting of two related but distinct prohibitions, has been judicially
expounded as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
Although the clauses literally apply only to federal laws, each applies to
actions by state governments through their incorporation by the Fourteenth
Amendment.131  This part first discusses (briefly, when possible) the most
important Supreme Court case law interpreting the Establishment Clause.
Next, this part succinctly discusses the two Supreme Court cases that have
interpreted the Establishment Clause in the context of the origins controversy.
This survey provides the legal background necessary for specifically analyzing
the constitutional implications of teaching intelligent design in the public
school science classroom. 
A. The Establishment Clause Tests and Norms
The Supreme Court does not uniformly apply any single test in determining
whether a law violates the Establishment Clause.132  For many years, the Court
consistently applied the three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,133 with only
one exception.134  Under the first prong of the Lemon test, the legislature must
have adopted the law with a secular purpose.135  Second, the statute's principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.136
Third, the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of government
with religion.137  Courts have applied the Lemon test to invalidate numerous
state policies and practices, including those operative in public schools.138
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
550 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:527
139. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia represent Lemon’s most vocal critics
on the bench.  For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the Court’s unwillingness to
apply Lemon uniformly and Lemon’s faulty doctrinal basis.  See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319-20 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia has likened
Lemon to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,” and observed that “five of the
currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the
creature's heart.”  Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).  For academic critiques of Lemon, see, for example, Jesse H.
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools — An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV.
5 (1987); Hal Culbertson, Religion in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon’s Purpose
Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 915; Philip B. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court,
34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1984); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986); Michael McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
140. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion).  
141. See id. at 686-91.
142. See id. at 686-90.
143. See id. at 691.
144. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
145. See id. at 881. 
146. See id. at 866-74.
Lemon has drawn severe criticism,139 and recent opinions of the Court
illustrate its inconsistent influence.  In the 2004 Supreme Court term, Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Van Orden v. Perry declined to apply
the Lemon test.140  Instead, in finding no constitutional impediment to
exhibiting a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas
State Capitol grounds (which featured seventeen monuments and twenty-one
historical markers on twenty-two acres of land), Chief Justice Rehnquist
(joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) focused on the nature of the
monument and the history of the nation.141  The plurality observed the
pervasive governmental acknowledgment of the role of God and religion
generally, and the Ten Commandments specifically, in our nation’s heritage,142
and concluded that the monument was a “passive use” of the religious text by
Texas, representing (along with other monuments) several strands in the state’s
political and legal history.143  
In the same term, however, Lemon commanded a majority of the Court in
McCreary County v. ACLU.144  In this case, the Court struck down two county
courthouse exhibits that prominently displayed the Ten Commandments (along
with other documents of historic interest that evinced our nation’s religious
heritage).145  The Court found that the counties had acted with the unlawful
purpose of advancing religion, in violation of the first prong of the Lemon
test.146  Far from ignoring Lemon, the Court applied it expansively, for the
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147. Id. at 864.
148. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
149. See id.
150. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
151. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305-10, 316 (2000) (holding
unconstitutional the practice of allowing student-elected representatives to pray before high
school football games); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a nativity scene on government
property). 
154. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that
it in fact ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678)).  
Court interpreted its requirement of a valid secular purpose to mandate one that
is “not merely secondary to a religious objective.”147
Related to the Lemon test is the “endorsement” test first articulated by
Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.148  This test recasts
Lemon as follows:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government’s
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.  The effect
prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose,
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement
or disapproval.  An affirmative answer to either question should
render the challenged practice invalid.149
When the question involves a religious activity in which the state arguably
participates, a relevant question is “whether an objective observer, acquainted
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would
perceive it as a state endorsement” of the religious activity.150  The
endorsement test reflects the judgment that governmental endorsement of
religion “sends a message to nonadherents” of the concept or practice endorsed
“that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community.”151  Correlatively, when government disapproves
of religion, it “sends the opposite message.”152  The endorsement test has been
followed by a majority of the Court on occasion,153 but never consistently.
Another test for ascertaining a violation of the Establishment Clause is that
of “noncoercion.”154  Under this test, a law violates the Establishment Clause
if the government’s promotion of religion either forces the profession of
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155. For example, in Santa Fe, the Court found coercion where, through a student election
authorized by the school district, a student was selected to deliver an invocation before high
school football games.  The coercion took the form of social pressure “to participate in an act
of religious worship.”  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312.
156. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution understood establishment to embody
actual legal coercion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the coercion of historical concern was that which occurred through “force of law
and threat of penalty”).
157. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).  
158. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating
that the common purpose of the religion clauses “is to secure religious liberty”). 
159. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
160. See id.  
161. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 875.
164. For two federal appellate court opinions decided since the Supreme Court last ruled on
the teaching of origins in the public schools, see Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37
religion or participation in a religious ceremony.  The Court has occasionally
found government action coercive, even when the government’s contribution
to the coercion is indirect and lacking any threat of penalty.155  Some Justices,
however, would limit the application of the coercion test to cases involving the
threat of actual legal force.156
Each of these tests may be understood as grounded in one or more norms
perceived to explain the purpose of the Establishment Clause.  Commonly
articulated norms include neutrality, or equality, either among religions or
between religion and nonreligion;157 religious liberty;158 separation of church
and state;159 and the avoidance of social divisiveness based upon religion.160
Recently, the Court has emphasized the neutrality norm: “The touchstone for
our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.’”161
Reiterating this point, the Court in McCreary County characterized religious
neutrality as the “central Establishment Clause value.”162  Indeed, Justice
Souter’s majority opinion devotes an entire section to explaining why the
neutrality norm has “provided a good sense of direction” in the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.163 
B. Cases on Origins
The United States Supreme Court has twice considered controversies over
the teaching of evolution in the public school science classroom.164  In
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F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a school district could require a high school biology
teacher to teach the theory of evolution), and Webster v. New Lennox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a school board could prohibit the teaching of creation science).
See also G. Sidney Buchanan, Evolution, Creation-Science, and the Meaning of Primary
Religious Purpose, 58 SMU L. REV. 303, 310-11 (2005). 
165. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
166. See id. at 109.  See generally ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1627 to -1628 (1960).  The statute
was adapted from the notorious Tennessee “monkey law” at issue in Scopes v. State, 289 S.W.
363 (Tenn. 1927), a case of Hollywood fame.  See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98.  Violation of the
statute constituted a misdemeanor and resulted in termination of the offending teacher’s
employment.  See id. at 99.
167. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103.  Thus, the Court held that the state could not constitutionally
forbid an instructor from teaching that the theory of evolution is true.  When the Arkansas
Supreme Court upheld the statute, it refused to express a view on whether the statute prohibited
explanation of the theory or forbade teaching that the theory is true.  See id. at 102.  The United
States Supreme Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional “on either interpretation
of its language.”  See id. at 103. 
168. Id. at 103.
169. Id. at 103-04 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952); McCollum v.
Epperson v. Arkansas,165 the Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas statute
forbidding any teacher in a state-supported school or university to teach, or
adopt a textbook advancing, the theory that mankind ascended or descended
from a lower order of animals.166  The Court so held, regardless of whether the
statute was construed to forbid instruction about the theory of evolution, or to
forbid “any or all of the infinite varieties of communication embraced within
the term ‘teaching.’”167  Concluding that the statute violated the Establishment
Clause, the Court identified as the “overriding fact” that the state had
proscribed a segment of “the body of knowledge” that was thought to “conflict
with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of
the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.”168
Just as the express language of the Court’s opinion identifies the
“overriding fact” of the case, so the structure and language of the opinion
discloses the overriding legal norm that guided the Court’s analysis —
neutrality.  At the inception of the Court’s legal analysis, the opinion
articulates, and even elevates, the neutrality norm in unmistakable terms:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral
in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may not be
hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of non-religion; and it
may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory
against another or even against the militant opposite.  The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.169
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Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
170. 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
171. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 728). 
172. Id. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
173. Id. at 106.
174. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106-07 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952)).
175. See id. at 107-09.
Having grounded its opinion firmly on the neutrality norm, the Court
insisted on the inability of government to suppress dissent from orthodoxy.
It quoted Watson v. Jones170 for the proposition that “[t]he law knows no
heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no
sect.”171  Similarly, the Court reiterated that the First Amendment prohibits
“laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”172  Again, said the
Court, the First Amendment does not authorize the state “to require that
teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any
religious sect or dogma.”173  This constitutional prohibition against state-
enforced orthodoxy derives directly from the neutrality norm, as the following
excerpt makes clear:
While study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and
historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, need not collide with the First Amendment's
prohibition, the State may not adopt programs or practices in its
public schools or colleges which “aid or oppose” any religion.  This
prohibition is absolute.  It forbids alike the preference of a religious
doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic
to a particular dogma.  As Mr. Justice Clark stated in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, “the state has no legitimate interest in
protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them . . . .”
The test was stated as follows in Abington School District v.
Schempp: “[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment?  If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution.”174
The Court had no difficulty concluding that the Arkansas statute violated
the constitutionally grounded neutrality norm.  The Court found that the state
enacted the legislation with a religious motive; it forbade discussion of the
theory of evolution because of its inconsistency with certain Biblically based
viewpoints.175  According to the Court, no evidence suggested that the law
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176. Id. at 107.
177. Id. at 109.
178. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
179. See id. at 596-97.
180. Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17:286.1-:286.7 (1982); see Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581.
181. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 582-83.
182. See id. at 585-97.
183. See id. at 585 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
184. See id. at 586-89.
185. See id. at 589-94.
186. See id. at 587-88. 
187. See id. at 588.
188. Id. at 591. 
could be justified “by considerations of state policy other than the religious
views of some of its citizens.”176  Thus, the law “cannot be defended as an act
of religious neutrality.”177
In the second case on origins considered by the Supreme Court, Edwards
v. Aguillard,178 the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that required
balanced instruction in public elementary and secondary schools on the theory
of evolution and creation science.179  The law required no instruction in origins
unless either theory was taught, in which case both theories must be taught.180
In holding that the law violated the Establishment Clause, the Court relied
upon the Lemon test,181 specifically upon its first prong.182  Construing
Lemon’s first prong to ask whether the actual purpose of the government is to
endorse or disapprove of religion,183 the Court found both the absence of a
secular purpose,184 and the presence of a primarily religious purpose.185
Although the stated secular purpose of the legislation was promoting
academic freedom, the Court rejected that rationale because the law’s sponsor
hoped to narrow the science curriculum, the law conferred no new authority
upon teachers to teach numerous scientific theories of origins, and the law
provided special resources for teaching creation science.186  Moreover, if the
secular purpose was to enhance science instruction, the law would have
encouraged presentation of all scientific theories about the origins of
humankind.187
The Court also found a primarily religious purpose for the law.  The Court
discerned in the case at bar the “same historic and contemporaneous
antagonisms between the teachings of certain religious denominations and the
teaching of evolution” that drove previous controversies over the teaching of
evolution in public schools.188  According to the Court, “[t]he preeminent
purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious
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189. Id.
190. Id. at 591 n.13.
191. Id. at 592-93 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 593.
viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind.”189  The Court noted
the “religious motives” that legislators revealed in speaking for the
legislation,190 and found a purpose to advance religion:
Furthermore, it is not happenstance that the legislature required
the teaching of a theory that coincided with this religious view [i.e.,
divine creation].  The legislative history documents that the Act’s
primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of public
schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a particular
religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in its
entirety.  The sponsor of the Creationism Act . . . explained during
the legislative hearings that his disdain for the theory of evolution
resulted from the support that evolution supplied to views contrary
to his own religious beliefs.  According to [him], the theory of
evolution was consonant with the “cardinal principle[s] of religious
humanism, secular humanism, theological liberalism, aetheistism
[sic].”  The state senator repeatedly stated that scientific evidence
supporting his religious views should be included in the public
school curriculum to redress the fact that the theory of evolution
incidentally coincided with what he characterized as religious
beliefs antithetical to his own.  The legislation therefore sought to
alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a religious
view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution.191
Because the primary purpose of the Louisiana statute was to advance a
particular religious belief, the law “endorse[d] religion in violation of the First
Amendment.”192
C. Summary
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, the constitutionality of teaching
intelligent design in the public school science classroom depends in part on
whether a decision to teach it (or forbid its teaching) is driven primarily by a
religious purpose.  Also relevant is whether any such decision will have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.  The precise test that the
Court would use to decide a case involving the teaching of intelligent design
is not perfectly clear.  Nevertheless, it is probable that the neutrality norm
would guide the Court’s analysis.  Whether the teaching of intelligent design
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193. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 245-257 and accompanying text.
195. A vast body of literature discusses the meaning of religion — both descriptively and
normatively — under the religion clauses.  See, e.g., A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining Religion
in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); James M. Donovan,
God Is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of “Religion,” 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 23 (1995); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 309 (1994); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law,
72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984); Val D. Ricks, To God God’s, to Caesar Caesar’s, and to Both the
Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053 (1993); C. John Sommerville, Defining
Religion and the Present Supreme Court, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167 (1994); Lee J.
Strang, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 181 (2002);
Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791 (1997); Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).  The cases cited in this
Article are discussed at length in this literature.  For a discussion of the attempts to provide
could ever survive scrutiny under these principles is the topic to which this
Article now turns. 
 III. Why All the Fuss: Controversial Threshold Questions
Ultimately, this Article argues that the constitutionality of teaching, or
forbidding the teaching of, intelligent design in the public school science
classroom depends on case-specific factors.  Before discussing these factors,
it is essential to address two threshold questions that have generated academic
controversy.  The threshold questions must be answered in the negative before
a consideration of the specific facts of any case is even necessary.  The first
question is whether evolution or intelligent design inherently constitutes a
religion or consists of religious ideas.  The second question is whether science
is inherently and absolutely nontheological (at least in its methodological
assumptions).  This Part explores each question in turn. 
A. Does Evolution or Intelligent Design Inherently Constitute a “Religion”
or Inherently Consist of “Religious” Ideas?
1. The Meaning of Religion
Opponents of teaching evolution by natural selection in the public schools
have charged (albeit, unsuccessfully thus far in the courts) that evolution is a
religion.193  Similarly, opponents of teaching intelligent design in the public
school science classroom have argued that intelligent design is a religion.194
A person unfamiliar with the judicial history interpreting the First Amendment
would likely assume that the definition of “religion” under the Constitution is
plainly articulated by now.  It is not.  The Court, however, has provided some
modest guidance on the meaning of religion.195
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some clarity to the meaning of “religion” in the lower courts (and for an argument that
intelligent design is not a “religion”), see DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 1, at 79-87.
196. 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (holding that antipolygamy laws do not establish a religion),
overruled on other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
197. The Court had previously considered the scope of the constitutional protection of
freedom of “religion.”  See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-68 (1879).
Although the Reynolds Court distinguished between religious belief and conduct, see id. at 164,
166, it declined to opine plainly upon the scope of “religious” belief or conduct.
198. See Davis, 133 U.S. at 342.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
202. Id. at 495-96.  See generally MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 37.
203. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11.
In Davis v. Beason,196 the Supreme Court’s earliest broad articulation of the
meaning of “religion,”197 the Court interpreted the term to refer to “one’s views
of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose” as a result
of reverence and as a matter of obedience.198  According to the Court, religion
was “often confounded” with a form of worship, but is distinguishable from
it.199  The religion clauses were intended
to allow everyone . . . to entertain such notions respecting his
relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be
approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his
sentiments in such form of worship as he may think proper, not
injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit legislation for
the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any
sect.200
Thus, under Davis v. Beason, “religion” has a relational perspective, a
devotional and moral orientation, a theistic aim, and often a doctrinal
grounding.
Since Davis v. Beason, the Supreme Court has broadened its conception of
religion, but not with clear boundaries.  In Torcaso v. Watkins,201 in which the
Court invalidated a provision of the Maryland Constitution that conditioned
service in public office on the profession of a belief in God,202 the Court
observed that various religions in the United States (including Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism) do not hold to a belief in
God.203  The Torcaso opinion obviously precludes any reading of Davis v.
Beason that the constitutional meaning of the term “religion” necessarily
requires a belief in God.  Plainly, under Torcaso, belief in God is not inherent
to religion.  A related principle must also not be overlooked.  Torcaso never
holds that “religion” is inherent to a belief in God.  Although this issue is
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204. See infra Part III.A.3.
205. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 (citing MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 37).
206. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
207. Id. at 164-65 (citing Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 456(j) (1958) (amended 1967 & 1971)).
208. Id. at 165-66.
209.  Id. at 176.
210. Id. at 180-83.  This “ever-broadening understanding” apparently refers to modern
efforts to conceptualize God as other than the personal, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent,
omnipresent Being who created all else that is.  This rationale of Seeger should be interpreted
to mean not that Congress intended any particular modern conception of God, but that Congress
intended to exempt even those whose views of God are not traditional.
211. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
212. Id. at 338.
discussed in detail below,204 for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that
the state constitutional provision at issue in Torcaso itself required profession
of belief in God explicitly as a religious test.205  The question of whether one
can maintain a belief in God that is not, strictly speaking, an element of one’s
“religion,” was not before the Court. 
  The remaining indicia of religion advanced in Davis v. Beason (i.e., those
indicia other than theistic aim) have resurfaced in some form in later Supreme
Court opinions.  In Seeger v. United States,206 the Court construed a federal
statute exempting from military service persons who object to such service on
account of their religious training and belief.  The federal law defined
“religious training and belief” as that “in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,” but
excluding beliefs that are primarily “political, sociological, or philosophical”
and those attributable to “a merely personal moral code.”207  The Court
construed the statute to differentiate the statutorily designated “Supreme
Being” from God, so that the statute afforded protection to all who held a
belief “that is sincere and meaningful” and that “occupies a place in the life of
its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption.”208  The Court adopted this test because it
“avoid[ed] imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious
beliefs,” and comported with the “congressional policy of equal treatment for
those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.”209
Further, the Court deemed its construction as “embrac[ing] the ever-
broadening understanding of the modern religious community.”210
The Court revisited the statute at issue in Seeger in Welsh v. United
States.211  In Welsh, the conscientious objector grounded his opposition to
combat in deeply held moral beliefs which were not associated with allegiance
to God or affiliation with any organized religious faith.212  The Court held that
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213. Id. at 343-44.
214. Id. at 339.
215. Id. at 340.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. For a brief discussion of how two federal appellate courts have articulated the meaning
of “religion,” see infra note 278.
220. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188-93 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(arguing that a construction of the statute that limited the concept of a Supreme Being to an
orthodox conception of God would render the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the Free
Exercise clause).
221. Justice Harlan concluded that the statute was properly construed to exempt from
military service only those whose objection to war arose from theistic beliefs, and that the
statute so construed violated the Establishment Clause.  See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 344 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).  
222. Justice White (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart) concluded that the
Court’s opinion was an unjustifiable construction of the statute, and that the objector was not
exempt from service regardless of whether the exemption (as properly construed) was
constitutional.  See id. at 367 (White, J., dissenting).  
the objector was entitled to exemption under the statute.213  The Court opined
that under Seeger, the determination of whether a registrant holds religious
beliefs in opposition to warfare rests on whether such beliefs “play the role of
a religion and function as a religion in the registrant’s life.”214  Opposition to
war must “stem from the registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about
what is right and wrong,” and the registrant must cling to such beliefs “with
the strength of traditional religious convictions.”215  The Court observed that
most “great religions” posit the existence of God (or some “Supreme Reality”)
who “communicates to man in some way a consciousness of what is right and
should be done, and what is wrong and therefore should be shunned.”216
According to the Court, if a person sincerely embraces purely moral
convictions that compel his conscience to refrain from combat, such beliefs
play a role analogous to a belief in God in traditional religions.217  Such an
objector is entitled to exemption under the statute “[b]ecause his beliefs
function as a religion in his life.”218
The majority opinions in Seeger and Welsh do not purport to define
“religion” for purposes of constitutional law.  Nonetheless, the concepts of
religion expressed in those opinions are relevant to determining the meaning
of religion under the First Amendment.219  First, as observed in Justice
Douglas’s concurring opinion in Seeger,220 Justice Harlan’s opinion concurring
in the result in Welsh,221 and Justice White’s dissent in Welsh,222 the
construction of the statute at issue had obvious constitutional implications.
For Justices Douglas and Harlan, the statute would have violated the
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223. See supra text accompanying notes 196-204.
224. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
225. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-40.
226. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
227. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-40.
228. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 195, at 759 (“Achieving a decent fit with what the
Supreme Court has said about defining religion in the last few decades is not particularly
difficult, because the Court has said very little.”); Peñalver, supra note 195, at 801 (“In sum,
the state of the search for a constitutional definition of religion in the courts could be charitably
described as unsettled.”).
229. See, e.g., McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(stating that the author of the model act upon which an Arkansas “Balanced Treatment” act was
based considers both creationism and evolution as religions); INST. FOR CREATION RESEARCH,
Establishment Clause if it were properly construed to exempt only those whose
objections to military service were grounded in a belief in God.  Insofar as the
definition of “religious” and “Supreme Being” under the statute had
constitutional implications, it is sensible to look to these opinions for guidance
as to the meaning of “religion” under the First Amendment.  Second, the Court
in Seeger and Welsh was willing to interpret “religious” belief very broadly.
A broad definition of “religion”, for First Amendment purposes, appeals to
many, insofar as a broad definition maximizes protection of the free exercise
of religion, and minimizes the risk that government will impose religious
orthodoxy on nonadherents.
Of special interest is that Seeger and Welsh reinforce much of the Court’s
constitutional understanding of the meaning of religion expressed in Davis v.
Beason, as limited by Torcaso v. Watkins.  According to the combined
guidance of the latter two cases, “religion” has a relational perspective, a
devotional and moral orientation, and often a doctrinal grounding.223  These
concepts resonate with the language of Seeger and Welsh, which associates
religion with tenets;224 guidance on what is right and wrong;225 relationship to
a power, being, or faith (such as subordination or dependency);226 and impact
on behavior.227
As others have perennially noted,228 the precise definition of “religion”
under the First Amendment is unknown.  However, the case law surveyed
above provides some direction in the quest for ascertaining the broad contours
of the concept of religion for purposes of constitutional law.  With these broad
contours discerned, the analyst is equipped to explore the question of whether
intelligent design or evolution is properly considered a religion.
2. Evolution and Religion
Some have argued that evolution is itself a religion, or at least advances or
subsumes inherently religious concepts.229  The assertion is misleading.  A
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SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 196, 200 (Henry M. Morris ed., 1974); Addicott, supra note 15, at
1565 (“[T]he argument can surely be made that the theory of evolution also qualifies as a
religion since Darwinian activists brazenly tout the theory of evolution as the central principle
of either evolutionism or Secular Humanism.”); John W. Whitehead & John Conlan, The
Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 47-54 (1978). 
230. For additional examples of religions that embrace evolutionary concepts, see Whitehead
& Conlan, supra note 229, at 48 n.233.
231. SPROUL, supra note 60, at 194-95 (citing SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADITION 127-28 (W.
Theodore de Bary ed., 1966)).  
232. See id. at 192.
233. The Mahapurana, or “The Great Legend,” was written by Jain teacher Jinasena in the
ninth century.  See id. 
more accurate statement is that evolution is not necessarily a religious concept,
although it can be a religious belief.
 That evolutionary theory most assuredly can be a religious belief is amply
documented.230  For example, Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, argued that
what appeared to be creation by beings who emerged from the “World of
Radiance” was really nothing more than the emergence of other beings from
such other world, which occurred “when this world [began] to evolve.”231
Even more striking is the evolution myth of Jainism.  Jainism holds that the
universe is uncreated by any god, and instead is maintained and changes by
natural principles.232  The Jain myth is defended in the following excerpts from
the Mahapurana,233 which advances arguments typical of atheistic
evolutionists:
Some foolish men declare that Creator made the world.  
The doctrine that the world was created is ill-advised, and should
be rejected. 
. . . . 
No single being had the skill to make this world — 
For how can an immaterial god create that which is material?
How could God have made the world without any raw material?
If you say he made this first, and then the world, you are faced
with an endless regression. 
. . . .
If out of love for living things and need of them he made the
world, 
Why did he not make creation wholly blissful, free from
misfortune? 
. . . .
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234. Id. at 192-93 (citing SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADITION, supra note 231, at 76-78).
235. See, e.g., Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 229, at 39, 44, 46 n.225, 47-54.  I credit
Whitehead and Conlan’s work for their citation to all of the works of Secular Humanism to
which this paper refers.
236. HUMANIST MANIFESTO I, § 1 (1933), reprinted in HUMANIST MANIFESTOS I AND II, at
8 (Paul Kurtz ed., 1973).
237. Id. § 2.
238. HUMANIST MANIFESTO II, Religion, § 2 (1973), reprinted in HUMANIST MANIFESTOS
I AND II, supra note 236, at 17.
239. Julian Huxley, Evolutionary Humanism, HUMANIST, Sept./Oct. 1962, at 201, 206.
240. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (“Among religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God
are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.”).
241. Indeed, many of the ancient Greek philosophers embraced evolutionary concepts.  For
a brief discussion of their views, see David Barton, A Death-Struggle Between Two
Civilizations, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 297, 303-04 (2001).
242. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Know that the world is uncreated, as time itself is, without
beginning and end, 
And is based on principles, life and the rest.234
Evolutionary concepts are not restricted to ancient Eastern religions.  As
others have observed, a modern religion that relies heavily on evolutionary
theory is secular humanism.235  Humanist Manifesto I declares the creed that
the universe is self-existing and uncreated,236 and that man is a “part of nature”
that has “emerged as the result of a continuous process.”237  Similarly, a
profession of Humanist Manifesto II is that “science affirms that the human
species is an emergence from natural evolutionary forces.”238  Sir Julian
Huxley, a prominent humanist, regarded evolutionary theory as the most
central tenet of Secular Humanism.239
Plainly, evolution can be a religious belief, and one that is central to the
doctrinal coherence of more than one religion.  Moreover, the Supreme Court
has properly recognized as “religions” several faiths that do not embrace a
Creator-God, but do embrace evolutionary theory.240  Nonetheless, it does not
follow that evolutionary theory is inherently religious.241  As discussed above,
“evolution” has several meanings, and most of them are not inherently
“religious” within the meaning of Supreme Court precedent.  Consider the
definition of evolution which means “change over time.”242  Nobody can
credibly argue that this meaning of evolution is “religious.”  Even certain
meanings of evolution that are more controversial — such as evolution by
universal common descent243 — are not inherently “religious.”  They do not
necessarily advance a relational perspective.  How one relates to one’s fellow
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244. Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (observing
the nonsense of finding a violation of the Establishment Clause when the state criminalizes
murder merely because the Bible forbids murder).
245. See, e.g., Deborah A. Reule, Note, The New Face of Creationism: The Establishment
Clause and the Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in Public Schools, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2555,
2556-61 (2001).
man (or to God) is not necessarily informed by universal common descent.
Neither does a belief in universal common descent necessarily have devotional
or moral implications; there is no reason to believe that an evolutionary
creationist who is a Christian would worship and obey God differently from
a young-earth creationist, for example.  Moreover, although universal common
descent may well form a doctrinal grounding in various religions, one can
discern a wide spectrum of faiths that are comfortable with this concept —
from evolutionary creationism in Christianity to godless evolution in Jainism
and Secular Humanism.
Further, that some proponents of evolution by natural selection share a
conviction with certain religions (and may themselves be members of one such
religious faith) does not render the theory inherently “religious.”  A premise
or conclusion held in two distinct disciplines does not result in one discipline’s
being subsumed within the other.244  For example, both a criminal psychologist
and a catholic priest may conclude that a named juvenile offender can be
rehabilitated (albeit, for different reasons) without rendering criminal
psychology religion, or religion criminal psychology.  Further, the criminal
psychiatrist does not inherently embrace a “religious” idea when she opines in
court that a convicted juvenile should be rehabilitated, rather than punished to
the fullest extent of the law.  Similarly, both a pathologist and a rabbi may
agree that a person should not eat raw bacon, but that common sentiment does
not justify the conclusion that the pathologist keeps kosher.  Neither does it
mean that pathology promotes, or even embraces, the teachings of Judaism.
Likewise, to assert that all forms of evolutionary theory are necessarily
“religious” is illogical.
3. Intelligent Design and Religion
Opponents of intelligent design, like opponents of evolution, have argued
that the view that they oppose subsumes religious belief.  The rationales of the
critics vary.  Some commentators lump all theories that assume a creative role
for God as “creationism” and then assert that “creationism” necessitates belief
in Christianity.245  For those who assert this claim, to teach intelligent design
is necessarily to teach religion, because (in their view) believing in intelligent
design is tantamount to believing in a religious faith — Christianity.  This
assertion is plainly false.  Intelligent design neither refers to the Genesis
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246. Further, I am confident that most Jewish students of Hebrew Scripture would beg to
differ with the notion that believing the Genesis account of creation necessarily renders one a
Christian!
247. See, e.g., Jeremiah 31:3; John 3:16; Romans 5:8, 8:38-39; Ephesians 2:4; 1 John 4:7-
11.
248. See, e.g., Psalm 86:15-16; John 1:14-17; Romans 3:23-24; Ephesians 2:4-9; Titus 2:11,
3:4-7.
249. See, e.g., Leviticus 11:44-45; Isaiah 6:1-3; 1 Peter 1:15-16; Revelation 4:8.
250. See, e.g., 1 Samuel 16:7; 1 Chronicles 28:9; Job 28:24; Psalms 44:21, 69:5, 139:15-16;
Isaiah 44:6-8, 45:21, 46:9-10; Jeremiah 1:5; Matthew 24:36; Acts 1:24; Hebrews 4:12-13.
251. See, e.g., Psalm 139:1-12; Jeremiah 23:23-24; Matthew 28:20.
252. See, e.g., Job 42:1-2; Isaiah 40:18-26, 41:1-4, 43:10-13, 44:24-28, 50:2-3; Jeremiah
32:27; Daniel 4:34-37; Mark 10:25-27; Ephesians 1:11.
253. See, e.g., Isaiah 52:13-53:12; Mark 10:45; Romans 3:21-26; Galatians 3:1-14; 1 Peter
1:18-21, 3:18.
254. See, e.g., Isaiah 63:1-6; Revelation 19:11-21.
255. See, e.g., John 1:1-3, 1:18, 10:30, 14:9-11, 14:16-18, 14:23, 15:26; Colossians 1:15-17;
Titus 2:13, 3:4-6; Hebrews 1:1-12.
256. E.g., Diana M. Rosenberg, Note, Monkey Business and Unnatural Selection: Opening
the Schoolhouse Door to Religion by Discrediting the Tenets of Darwinism, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 611
(2001); see also Wexler, supra note 15, at 814-25; David R. Bauer, Note, Resolving the
Controversy over “Teaching the Controversy”: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent
Design in Public Schools, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1019, 1052-54 (2006).
257. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring);
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716-23 (M.D. Pa. 2005); McLean v.
Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1265-66 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp.
1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aff’d, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curium).
258. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
account (or discussions in other portions of the Bible of God’s creative work)
nor — unlike scientific creationism — does it attempt to harmonize scientific
data with any particular theological interpretation of Genesis (or other Biblical
texts).246  Neither does intelligent design even begin to address the vast scope
of what Christian scripture says about the nature and purposes of God (e.g.,
His inexplicable love for mankind,247 His grace,248 His holiness,249 His
omniscience,250 His omnipresence,251 His omnipotence,252 His plan of
redemption,253 His wrath,254 and His triune nature 255).  
The more interesting question is whether intelligent design, although not
distinctively Christian, nonetheless is a “religion,” or inherently consists of one
or more “religious” ideas.  Some have argued that all theories (including,
arguably, intelligent design) that “presuppose a supreme being” are “inherently
religious.”256  Although a handful of jurists in the country have so opined,257
this argument is dubious as applied to intelligent design theory.  One problem
with the argument is that intelligent design theory does not explicitly argue
that the designer is supernatural, let alone divine.258  Moreover, even if one
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259. See id. (explaining how one could argue that the logic of intelligent design inevitably
points to a supernatural designer).
260. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
261. Cf. Addicott, supra note 15, at 1586 (“[T]he same reasoning that prompts refusal to
equate the theory of evolution with a religious belief . . . can easily be applied in refusing to link
the study of intelligent design with a religious belief.  Both ideas have metaphysical or religious
implications, but both are based on a scientific framework, not faith.”).
262. Cf. Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 15, at 487 (“[S]ome philosophers have
argued that belief in God may not even be a sufficient condition for a belief to be religious if
‘God’ is employed as an explanatory postulate rather than worshiped as an object of devotion.”).
263. See HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN, FROM THE GREEKS TO DARWIN: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE EVOLUTION IDEA THROUGH TWENTY-FOUR CENTURIES 78-88 (2d ed. 1929).  In
evaluating  intelligent design theory, others have noted Aristotle’s conception of God.  See, e.g.,
Beckwith, Science and Religion, supra note 15, at 460. 
264. See OSBORN, supra note 263, at 79.
265. See id. at 80-81.  The four causes may be described as material (i.e., a natural object’s
substance), formal (i.e., its shape or form), efficient (i.e., the instrumental means of production),
and final (i.e., the purpose for the natural object).  See ARISTOTLE, II PHYSICS 3.194b24-.195a3,
reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 332-
33 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE].
266. See OSBORN, supra note 263, at 80.
267. See ARISTOTLE, XII METAPYHSICS 7.1072b1-b30, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 265, at 1694-95.
believes that the logic of intelligent design compels the conclusion that the
designer is supernatural,259 it does not follow that intelligent design is
inherently religious.  The discussion of why evolution is not inherently
religious applies equally with respect to intelligent design.
First, as discussed above, that a premise or conclusion is held in two distinct
disciplines does not mean that one discipline is subsumed within the other.260
If belief in the existence of an ultimate, intelligent, nonmaterial entity is not
confined to religion, the notion that intelligent design embraces an inherently
religious concept is highly suspect.261  
History confirms that belief in the existence of some ultimate, intelligent
entity — which may even be identified as God — is not confined to religion.262
For example, the renowned Greek philosopher Aristotle saw an ascending
order in nature (from the imperfect to the perfect) driven by a purpose or
goal.263  He assumed “intelligent Design as the primary cause of things, by the
perfection and regularity which he observed in Nature.”264  Viewing nature as
a principle of motion and rest, Aristotle postulated four causes in nature.265
One of these causes was the Prime Mover (or Unmoved Mover) — Aristotle’s
concept of God.266
Aristotle reasoned that his Unmoved Mover, which he identified as God,267
is eternal, because (1) movement is eternal, and (2) there is no movement
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268. See id. 6.1071b3-b12, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note
265, at 1692-93; ARISTOTLE, VIII PHYSICS 6.258b10-.260a19, reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 265, at 432-34.
269. ARISTOTLE, XII METAPYHSICS 6.1071b30, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE, supra note 265, at 1693. 
270. See id. 7.1072b1-.1073a13, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra
note 265, at 1694-95.
271. See id. 9.1074b15-.1075a10, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE,
supra note 265, at 1698-99.
272. Id. at 7.1072b27-b31, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note
265, at 1695.
273. JUDE P. DOUGHERTY, THE LOGIC OF RELIGION 20 (2003).
274. Id.
275. “The question of God’s existence belongs to the sphere of metaphysics.”  Id. at 5.  The
term “metaphysics” was first used in reference to the works of Aristotle.  William Turner,
Metaphysics, in 10 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA pt. I (2003), http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/10226a.htm.  Precisely what “metaphysics” means is subject to debate.  See id. pt. II
(discussing several definitions of metaphysics).  Metaphysics can be conceived of as science,
as well as philosophy.  See id.  Its object of inquiry is “the most general and fundamental
principles underlying all reality and all knowledge.”  Id.  The important point is that
metaphysical thought — including the process of reasoning to an Ultimate Principle that is
responsible for design in the universe — is not confined to religious thought.  Cf. DeWolf,
Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 1, at 87 (“This potential for metaphysical extrapolation . . . does
not make design theory a religious doctrine.”).
276. See LEO STRAUSS, PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 108 (Fred Baumann trans., Jewish Publ’n
Soc’y, 1st English ed. 1987) (1935).
without a mover.268  There must be a mover because matter “will surely not
move itself.”269  This Mover is a first principle that is indivisible and without
magnitude, which produces movement by being loved.270  God is in some way
the entity of thought thinking itself,271 the ultimate good.  Aristotle explains the
implications of his concept of God as follows: “[T]he actuality of thought is
life, and God is that actuality; and God’s essential actuality is life most good
and eternal.  We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good,
so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is
God.”272
Aristotle’s views, unlike many other views of Greek philosophers, are
difficult to characterize as “religious.”  He “provides no significant text on the
subject of religion,”273 and “one would look in vain for texts in which he
prescribes homage or piety.”274  His views are better described as
metaphysical.275  Hence, Aristotle illustrates that to extrapolate design from
nature, and to view nature as pointing to a nonmaterial, ultimate intelligence,
is not to advance an inherently religious proposition.  
Of course, that Aristotle’s god “is truly not the God of Israel” (at least not
necessarily) should be obvious.276  Although Aristotle’s god is eternal and
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277. See DEWOLF, WEST, LUSKIN & WITT, supra note 16, at 65 (“Given that such pagan
philosophers as Plato were advocates of design, it is hard to see that religion itself is necessarily
implied by ID, much less some particular religion.”).
278. For a similar analysis that relies on the Third and Ninth Circuits’ three-part test of what
constitutes a “religion,” see DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 1, at 80-87.  According
to the Third and Ninth Circuits, a religion (1) addresses fundamental, ultimate questions
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See Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996); Africa v. Pennsylvania,
662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981).
279. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 15, at 817-18.
281. See Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 15, at 489.
nonmaterial, it is not one who creates matter ex nihilo.  By possible contrast,
the designing agent arguably implied by intelligent design theory may be a
creative being with characteristics possessed by the God of the Bible or the
Qur’an (for example).  On the other hand, numerous attributes of God revealed
in sacred texts are not attributed to the agent of design under intelligent design
theory — nor could they be.  If (like Aristotle) one finds the presence of
purposeful design in nature compelling, but (unlike Aristotle) one cannot
conceive how such design could exist apart from a designing being who
creates, one may logically infer the probability of a creative designer.  Such
logic, however, does not further compel one to embrace the position that the
intelligent agent of design is the God described in any world religion.277
Moreover, the better view is that intelligent design is not inherently
religious under the Supreme Court cases interpreting the meaning of religion
under the First Amendment.278  Intelligent design is not innately religious for
the same reasons that many senses of the term “evolution” are not necessarily
religious.  Intelligent design offers no relational perspective; it says nothing
about whether or how the designer relates to the designed objects, and nothing
about how that which is designed interrelates.279  Intelligent design has no
devotional or moral orientation; it does not so much as call for a scintilla of
respect for the designer, nor does it state that the designer (or any part of the
designed order) is a moral being.  Finally, contrary to the arguments of some
commentators,280 the correspondence between the fact of an intelligent
designer and the doctrinal grounding of many major world religions in a
creator does not establish that intelligent design is religious.  Although the
presence of a creator is very important in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (for
example), the same can be said of the importance of evolutionary theory in
several nontheistic religions.281  Moreover, intelligent design does not purport
to attribute design to a single designer, so it is just as consistent with
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polytheistic religions as it is with monotheistic faiths.  Thus, as is the case with
religions embracing evolutionary theory, a wide spectrum of religious beliefs
are consistent with intelligent design — from young-earth creationism to
Hinduism, and even Native American religions.  Moreover, intelligent design
posits no higher purpose in design.  In many faiths, creation is important
precisely because of its role in the purpose of a creator.  The absence of
doctrinal content in intelligent design (relative to that which characterizes
recognized religious faiths) is further grounds for concluding that it is not
inherently religious.282 
Some have argued that the Supreme Court has rejected this logical and
historically plausible position that belief in an intelligent designer is not
inherently religious.283  After all, the argument goes, the Court in Edwards v.
Aguillard stated that the purpose of Louisiana’s Creationism Act was to
modify the science curriculum “to conform with a particular religious
viewpoint,”284 and that the primary purpose of the state legislature was “clearly
to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created
humankind.”285  The question, then, is whether the Supreme Court found that
belief in a Supreme Being is inherently a “religious viewpoint.”
Those who answer this question affirmatively find their best support in the
following excerpt from Edwards:
The term “creation science” was defined as embracing this
particular religious doctrine [i.e., that a supernatural being created
humankind] by those responsible for the passage of the Creationism
Act. . . . [The] leading expert on creation science . . . testified at the
legislative hearings that the theory of creation science included
belief in the existence of a supernatural creator. . . . The legislative
history therefore reveals that the term “creation science,” as
contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the
creation of humankind.286
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creation science to include the following:
the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate (a) sudden creation of
Although a possible (and certainly, the most simplistic) interpretation of this
language is that belief in a Supreme Being is inherently religious, this
interpretation is not the most sensible reading of the opinion, taken as a whole.
The key to understanding this excerpt is the phrase modifying “creation
science” in the last sentence of the excerpt — “as contemplated by the
legislature that adopted this Act.”287  This “creation science,” which the Court
described as embodying a religious belief,288 arose in a legislative context
highly sympathetic to a view of life’s origins that parallel several details of one
interpretation of Genesis (young-earth creationism).  This legislative context
was plainly of serious concern to the Court.  In concluding that summary
judgment had been granted properly in the proceedings below, the Court stated
that the motion for summary judgment rested not only on the language of the
state statute at issue, but also (in relevant part) on “the legislative history and
historical context” of the law, the “specific sequence of events” preceding the
law’s enactment, and a report of the state’s education department that had been
based upon a survey of school superintendents.289  As observed previously, the
Court found that the legislative history of the Creationism Act revealed the
“religious motives” of several legislators supporting the bill.290  Further, the
Court assigned weight to the meaning of “creation science” as understood by
respondents to a 1981 survey conducted by the state’s Department of
Education.291  The school superintendents responsible for implementing the
balanced treatment act were asked in this survey to interpret “creation
science.”292  Approximately 75% understood “creation science” to be a
religious doctrine, and most of them thought it referred to “the literal
interpretation of the Book of Genesis.”293
This link between creation science and one specific interpretation of
Genesis did not escape the attention of Justice Powell, who in a concurring
opinion noted that a previous draft of the bill that eventually became the
Creationism Act defined “creation-science” essentially as scientific evidence
for the young-earth interpretation of Genesis.294  Although the bill was later
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the universe, energy, and life from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and
natural selection in bringing about development of all living kinds from a single
organism; (c) changes only within fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants
and animals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) explanation of the earth’s
geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f)
a relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds.
Id.
295. See id. at 601.
296. Id. at 603-04.
297. For a similar (but briefer) analysis of Edwards on this point, see Addicott, supra note
15, at 1583-84.
amended to delete a list of specific scientific evidences for the young-earth
view of Genesis, the legislator who proposed the amendment stated that it was
not intended to defeat the purpose of the bill in any way; rather, he apparently
did not want to suggest an “all inclusive list” of scientific evidences.295  Justice
Powell concluded that the major elements of creation science “parallel[ed] the
Genesis story of creation,” and that this was a religious belief that explained
the existence of the Creationism Act.296
In view of the legislative context of the Creationism Act, which obviously
influenced the Edwards Court, the better view of the opinion is the following:
the Court concluded that the statute at issue required the teaching of the
religious view that a Supreme Being created the universe, not simply a
scientific view that a Supreme Being created the universe.297  In other words,
the Court surmised that the real purpose of the legislature was to promote a
religious view of creation, and that it would use science as but a tool to do so.
The Court appears to have believed that scientific evidence advanced by
creation science in the classroom was offered ultimately to confirm the
religious belief that the state legislature was attempting to promote.  
Thus, properly understood, Edwards does not, as a matter of law, hold that
belief in an intelligent creator or designer is an inherently religious view.
Rather, the opinion supports the following propositions:
(1) Belief in a Supreme Being who created the universe most certainly can
be a religious belief;
(2) The Louisiana legislature that enacted the Creationism Act held to the
belief that a Supreme Being created the universe;
(3) The Louisiana legislature’s belief was, under the facts of the case, a
religious belief; and
(4) The Louisiana legislature sought, through the Creationism Act, to
promote their religious belief in a Supreme Being who created the universe.
This understanding of Edwards not only is highly plausible in light of the
offending act’s legislative context, but also comports well with the Court’s
statement that instructing children in numerous scientific theories of the origin
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by Professor Michael Ruse (and adopted by the district court in McLean) as “a laughingstock
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John Angus Campbell, Intelligent Design, Darwinism, and the Philosophy of Public Education,
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301. The question at hand is primarily philosophical, not scientific.  See Beckwith, Public
Education, supra note 15, at 469.
of man “might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the
effectiveness of science instruction.”298  If a scientific theory of the origin of
man happens to coincide in some respect with a religious theory of human
origin, Edwards does not forbid it, at least when the secular purpose for
teaching it is clear.  In such circumstances, the science should not be rendered
“religious” through a juristic metamorphosis that banishes it to the sanctuary,
synagogue, or mosque.  
B. Is Science Inherently Nontheological?
The origins controversy has spurred vigorous debate about the nature of
science.  Addressing the issue broadly, some philosophers of science have
attempted to establish demarcation criteria for distinguishing science from
other disciplines.  Although at least two district courts have adopted one or
more of such demarcation criteria,299 many philosophers of science generally
appear skeptical that science can be so neatly circumscribed.300  
This Article does not explore the debate over demarcation criteria in detail.
Rather, this paper focuses on what is probably the most important
scientific/philosophical301 question raised by demarcation criteria in the origins
controversy: must science refrain from referring to supernatural causation in
order to remain scientific?  Even more pointedly, is science inherently
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nontheological?  Strictly speaking, the two questions are not identical.  A
supernatural phenomenon may not correspond to any human conception of
God or His activity.  Insofar as many people understand God as some type of
supernatural entity, however, this discussion will speak of the “supernatural”
as a potentially theological concept.
The question is not only philosophically intriguing; it also is
constitutionally relevant, for two reasons.  First, even if intelligent design is
not inherently religious, the probability that religious motivations may have
impelled a decision to teach intelligent design in the classroom appears greater
if intelligent design does not qualify as “science.”  Secondly, and more
generally, if science need not refrain from referring to probable supernatural
causation, a governmental decision to prohibit scientists (and science teachers)
from referring to probable supernatural causation raises concerns under the
Establishment Clause.302
In analyzing whether science must shun references to supernatural
causation, this part of the Article briefly discusses what many philosophers of
science believe to be a fundamental commitment of scientific inquiry —
methodological naturalism — and why it is necessary.  Next this Article posits
two competing versions of methodological naturalism.  Finally, this Article
explains why intelligent design is consistent with one version of
methodological naturalism.
1. Science, Supernatural Causation, and Methodological Naturalism
Many prominent scientists and philosophers of science — as well as the
judge in Kitzmiller303 — believe that science must strictly foreclose
supernatural explanations (and divine explanations, in particular).  Professor
Michael Ruse is representative.  When doing science, Ruse explains, “one
denies God a role in the creation.”304  In fairness, Ruse means only that
scientific inquiry, as such, posits no role for God as it searches for an
explanation for observed phenomena.  He continues, “This is not to say that
God did not have a role in the creation.”305  Whatever the merits of thoughts
about God, they simply have no place in science.  “[T]heology can and must
be ruled out as irrelevant” to science, claims Ruse.306
To understand why Ruse maintains this position, it is helpful to
acknowledge that many philosophers of science, and probably most research
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scientists, are committed to methodological naturalism.  A prominent and
highly capable spokesperson for this view is Professor Robert Pennock, an
expert witness in Kitzmiller, who explains that methodological naturalism is
an assumption, or methodological rule, for investigating the natural world.307
Unlike ontological naturalism, which claims that the material world is all that
exists, methodological naturalism simply assumes that a natural explanation
exists for observed phenomena, and then proceeds by seeking to discover that
natural explanation.308  According to Pennock, methodological naturalism does
not go so far as to “make a commitment directly to a picture of what exists in
the world.”309  Thus, to state that science “assumes” a natural explanation for
natural phenomena means only that, for purposes of investigation and inquiry,
science seeks a natural explanation.  To illustrate, one may seek to explain
why chemotherapy may stop the progression of cancer by assuming that a
naturalistic explanation exists, without taking a position on whether God
Himself heals cancer patients (directly or indirectly).
Observe that methodological naturalism, as articulated by Pennock, Ruse,
and others like them, purports to be facially neutral concerning the divine.
Their description of methodological naturalism suggests that science does not
assert that only a natural explanation exists, that a supernatural explanation for
a natural phenomenon may not complement a scientific explanation, or that a
rival supernatural explanation for a phenomenon is inferior to the “scientific”
explanation.  Thus, methodological naturalism does not foreclose the
possibility that the very object of scientific inquiry (say, the structure of the
human eye) may be studied and explained (perhaps even in a superior fashion)
in some other discipline, such as religion.  Science is simply blind, deaf, and
mute towards the existence (or nonexistence) of God and His activity.
Logically, one might surmise from this description of methodological
naturalism that it assumes only that a natural explanation for an observed
natural phenomenon may exist, not that a natural explanation must exist.
However, the leading philosophers of science who champion methodological
naturalism endorse only the latter assumption.  For example, Ruse states
explicitly that a methodological naturalist “assumes that the world runs
according to unbroken law” and that people “can understand the world in
terms of this law.”310  Similarly, Pennock writes, “Lawful regularity is at the
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very heart of the naturalistic world view and to say that some power is
supernatural is, by definition, to say that it can violate natural laws.”311
In other words, Ruse and Pennock assert that the scientific method assumes
that every natural phenomenon has a solely naturalistic explanation.  If the
evidence, no matter how vast, fails to support a naturalistic explanation for a
phenomenon, the scientist may not infer a nonnaturalistic explanation.  Rather,
the scientist must continue to assume that a naturalistic explanation exists and
gather additional evidence under the assumption that a plausible naturalistic
explanation will surface.
2. Distinguishing Two Types of Methodological Naturalism
In order to assess whether the courts should accept this articulation of the
scientific method without qualification, it is helpful to return to the question
of what “methodological naturalism” necessarily means.  As observed above,
it is theoretically possible that science could commit itself merely to the
assumption that a natural explanation for an observed natural phenomenon
may exist, not that a natural explanation must exist.  This Article will refer to
the former as nonexclusionary methodological naturalism, and to the latter as
exclusionary methodological naturalism.  A scientific method based upon
nonexclusionary methodological naturalism would substantively consider
natural explanations for all natural phenomena, but would not ignore the
possibility that evidence, discovered through research, may point to a
nonnatural explanation.312  In contrast, a scientific method based upon
exclusionary methodological naturalism would not only consider natural
explanations for natural phenomena, but also would simply disregard the
possibility that scientific discoveries may point to a nonnatural explanation.
Both scientific methods would embrace the same experiments and consider the
same evidence.  But whereas researchers following nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism would be free to conclude that the evidence is not
explained well in purely naturalistic terms, the exclusionary methodological
naturalist would not enjoy that freedom.  Ruse, Pennock, and those who share
their views endorse only exclusionary methodological naturalism.313 
What is especially noteworthy in the current debate about the nature of
science is that the arguments advanced in favor of exclusionary
methodological naturalism do not invalidate nonexclusionary methodological
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naturalism.  One argument in favor of exclusionary methodological naturalism
is that it promotes further scientific inquiry.314  By insisting on the existence
of a naturalistic explanation, science keeps looking until (it is hoped) a natural
explanation for a phenomenon under investigation is discovered.  Promoting
further scientific inquiry is indeed vitally important.  However, science based
on nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is no less likely to continue
investigatory research than is science based on exclusionary methodological
naturalism.  Because the assumption of nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism is that a natural explanation may indeed surface, there is no reason
to cease research.  Unlike the exclusionary methodological naturalist, however,
the nonexclusionary methodological naturalist is free to publish her tentative
conclusions that the existing evidence points to a nonnatural explanation.
A second argument advanced in favor of exclusionary methodological
naturalism is that it, unlike other methods, produces conclusions that are
falsifiable.315  However, the same is true of nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism.  Because nonexclusionary methodological naturalism by definition
is always open to the possibility that a natural explanation for a phenomenon
exists, its inferences that a nonnatural explanation best explains a phenomenon
at any moment is subject to refutation should additional research suggest a
contrary inference.
Additionally, some argue that controlled experiments subject to replication
would be impossible sans the assumption of exclusionary methodological
naturalism.316  Such experiments, it is argued, require one to assume that
“supernatural entities do not intervene to negate lawful regularities.”317  Again,
the argument suffers from overstatement.  Controlled experimentation can take
place as long as one assumes that supernatural entities may not — rather than
do not — “intervene to negate lawful regularities.”  With the assumption that
natural phenomena have the potential to explain whatever is under
investigation, one is free to reach an inductive inference expressed in
naturalistic terms whenever the evidence so indicates.  Nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism thus satisfies the predicate for conducting
controlled experiments.
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3. Intelligent Design and Methodological Naturalism
The next question, of course, is whether intelligent design is consistent with
either version of methodological naturalism.  Intelligent design is essentially
an inference that certain natural phenomena cannot be explained by purely
natural, blind processes.318  Strictly speaking, intelligent design theory does not
expressly state that the intelligent designer is supernatural; the designer
theoretically could be an unknown natural entity.319  Nevertheless, if, as
intelligent design theorists maintain, specified complexity points to an
intelligent designer, and if that designer is natural, how could this designer
come to be apart from an even superior intelligence?  Under the theory of
intelligent design, it is difficult to conceive how any such natural designer,
which surely itself is characterized by specified complexity, could exist apart
from another designer.  Ultimately, therefore, the theory of intelligent design
seems to point either to an infinite regression of “natural” intelligent designers
(a logically troublesome concept), or to a single designer who transcends the
natural realm.  Although the issue is not entirely free from doubt, the better
view is that intelligent design theory strongly implies, and perhaps even
logically requires under its own terms, at least one supernatural intelligent
agent.  
The remainder of this Article assumes, without deciding, what some
intelligent design theorists are unwilling to concede — that the logic of
intelligent design necessarily points to a supernatural intelligence.  This Article
does not assume that the designer is necessarily “God,” but only that the
designer is not a product of purely natural processes — at least not those
known to current science.  Under the assumption that the intelligent designer
is not a product of purely natural processes, intelligent design, by definition,
would be inconsistent with exclusionary methodological naturalism. 
However, even under the assumption that intelligent design ultimately
requires a supernatural intelligent agent, the better view is that intelligent
design is consistent with nonexclusionary methodological naturalism.320  To
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see why this conclusion is correct, recall that nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism is committed only to the assumption that a natural explanation may
explain a given natural phenomenon.  As scientific inquiry proceeds, along the
way the evidence may suggest that a nonnatural explanation better accounts
for a natural phenomenon than a purely naturalistic explanation.  It is at this
point that intelligent design theorists are free to make their case.  Intelligent
design can be understood as the articulation of the inference of a nonnatural
explanation for scientific evidence gathered through the scientific process
guided by nonexclusionary methodological naturalism.321  In other words,
intelligent design can be understood as one “inferential phase” in the long
process of scientific inquiry.322  Because the scientific inquiry is committed to
nonexclusionary methodological naturalism, intelligent design is not
necessarily the final phase of the process.  New evidence may later surface to
negate the inference that a natural cause alone cannot plausibly explain the
researched phenomenon. 
So understood, even under the contested assumption that intelligent design
requires a supernatural intelligence, intelligent design appears to be a
legitimate part of scientific inquiry.  It would cease to be “scientific” only if
it refuses to subject itself to the rigors of critical inquiry posed by competing
theories, or if it maintains positions that are clearly inconsistent with scientific
data.  Indeed, intelligent design may illustrate why science based on
nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is superior to science based on
exclusionary methodological naturalism.  Because science based on
exclusionary methodological naturalism is content to assume that a natural
explanation for every element in the natural world must exist, a scientific
theory resulting from this method may find acceptance with little widespread
critical assessment, notwithstanding its implausibility, as long as it is the best
natural theory that one can conceive at the moment.323  In contrast, because
nonexclusionary methodological naturalism allows for nonnatural inferences,
more-or-less implausible naturalistic theories that are merely the “best
available” at any moment face a greater challenge than they do under the
assumption of exclusionary methodological naturalism.  They essentially face
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a new rival — such as intelligent design in the origins debate — that
encourages a sense of urgency in discovering more plausible naturalistic
explanations.  Thus, science based upon nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism may actually accelerate the discovery of better naturalistic
explanations for observed phenomena.324
IV. Two Constitutional Questions
This Part sketches the analysis necessary to answer two crucial
constitutional questions raised by the foregoing discussion.  The analysis is
preliminary, and thus lays the foundation for future development.  The two
questions are easily stated.  First, under what circumstances does the
Establishment Clause permit a governmental body (such as a public school
board) to authorize (or perhaps even require) the teaching of intelligent design
in the public school science classroom?  Second, under what circumstances is
a governmental body’s decision to prohibit the teaching of intelligent design
unconstitutional?
The analysis in this Part will proceed primarily under both the Lemon test,325
with a focus on the first two prongs, and Justice O’Connor’s endorsement
test.326  The tests will be applied with special attention to how the neutrality
norm should inform the analysis.327  This Article invokes the neutrality norm
for two reasons.328  First, a majority of the Court relied heavily upon the
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and Religion, supra note 15, at 470-77.
neutrality norm.329  Second, in Epperson v. Arkansas, the first Supreme Court
case to consider the teaching of evolution in the public schools, the Court
emphasized that the religion clauses require governmental neutrality among
religions, and between religion and nonreligion.330
A. When Does the Constitution Permit Governmental Administrators to
Authorize or Require the Teaching of Intelligent Design?
Assume a science teacher desires to teach intelligent design in the
classroom, and her colleagues discourage her from doing so.  The teacher
seeks explicit approval of the public school board for teaching intelligent
design.  May the board permit it?  Alternatively, the board requires all science
teachers to teach intelligent design as part of the biology curriculum.  May the
board do so?
Under the right circumstances, the answer to each question is “yes.”  First,
for the reasons discussed above, intelligent design theory is not per se
religious.331  Of course, this conclusion does not end the inquiry.  Determining
whether a decision to teach (or require the teaching of) intelligent design fails
the Lemon test, or constitutes governmental endorsement of religion, requires
a court to account for the presence (or absence) of numerous facts surrounding
the decision.
Lemon requires, in relevant part, (1) the board to have adopted the policy
with a secular purpose, and (2) the primary effect of the board’s action to have
neither advanced nor inhibited religion.332  Justice O’Connor’s endorsement
test requires that an objective observer, acquainted with all relevant facts (the
text of the policy, the history of the board’s decision, and the implementation
of the policy), would not perceive the policy as a state endorsement of
religion.333  Regarding both the first prong of Lemon and (per Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test) the likely perception of an objective observer
of the board’s policy, a valid secular purpose could be the enrichment of the
science curriculum.  Whether intelligent design advances science is a
controversial question — one upon which this Article does not unequivocally
opine.  But given the credentials of intelligent design advocates334 and the
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335. Judge Jones’ assertion in Kitzmiller that intelligent design has not generated peer-
reviewed publications, see Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735, 745
(M.D. Pa. 2005), is clearly erroneous.  See DEWOLF, WEST, LUSKIN & WITT, supra note 16, at
52-53 (discussing peer-reviewed publications supporting intelligent design theory).  
336. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 383-84 (arguing that “based on science,” one could
say that “intelligent design is one possible component of a full theory of how complex life
developed”).
337. See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 344-46 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a valid secular purpose under Lemon includes a school board’s desire to disclaim
any orthodoxy of belief that children might infer from an evolution-only biology curriculum,
and its desire to reduce offense that could be caused by teaching evolution).  The Freiler Court
also held, however, that the school board’s required disclaimer violated the “effect” prong of
Lemon because its primary effect was “to protect and maintain a particular religious viewpoint,
namely belief in the Biblical version of creation.”  Id. at 346.  Central to the court’s holding is
that the disclaimer required by the school board not only (1) disavowed any endorsement of
evolution and (2) urged students to consider “alternative” theories of life’s origins, but also
(3) reminded students that they had the right to maintain their parents’ beliefs and (4)
specifically referred only to one alternative theory — the “Biblical version of Creation.”  See
id.  The court found that the disclaimer thereby encouraged students “to read and meditate upon
religion” generally, and “the ‘Biblical version of Creation’” in particular.  Id.  Teaching
intelligent design can further the valid secular purposes in Freiler without running afoul of the
effect prong of Lemon, insofar as intelligent design is not inherently religious.  See BECKWITH,
supra note 1, at 63-69.
338. See DEWOLF, WEST, LUSKIN & WITT, supra note 16, at 60-62 (citing statements of
evolutionary biologists who interpret Darwinian theory to be hostile to theistic beliefs).
339. For example, Richard Dawkins, an outspoken evolutionist, in response to the question
of why some people find “the theistic answer” satisfying at some level, stated as follows:
“Wouldn’t it be lovely to believe in an imaginary friend who listens to your thoughts, listens
to your prayers, comforts you, consoles you, gives you life after death, can give you advice?
Of course it’s satisfying, if you can believe it.  But who wants to believe a lie?”  The Problem
with God: Interview with Richard Dawkins, Interview by Laura Sheahen with Richard Dawkins,
Charles Simonyi Professor of the Pub. Understanding of Sci., Oxford Univ., in Amherst, N.Y.
(Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.beliefnet.com/story/178/story_17889.html.  Similarly, in response
quality of their scholarship,335 it is not unthinkable that a board could conclude
that teaching intelligent design will better the science curriculum.336  Such a
conclusion gives rise to a legitimate secular purpose under Lemon, and one
that would probably be recognizable as such to an objective observer under the
endorsement test.
Other secular purposes are also plausible, including creating a curriculum
that is more theologically neutral — one that is not hostile to those religious
faiths that have something in common with intelligent design.337  This point
must be explored in some detail.  In the debate about origins, hostility towards
theistic beliefs (especially, but not limited to, those associated with some forms
of special creationism) is not uncommon.338  Some leading proponents of
naturalistic evolution are openly hostile towards belief in a Supreme Being.339
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to the question of how he would feel were his daughter to become religious, Dawkins first
recognized her right to choose for herself, and then quipped that “I think she’s much too
intelligent to do that.”  Id. 
340. See, e,g., DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 5 (3d ed. 1998) (“Darwin
made theological or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous.”); DOUGLAS J.
FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR EVOLUTION 12-13 (1983) (stating that “the
message of evolution” seems to be that man “was not designed, has no purpose, and is the
product of mere material mechanism”).
341. See Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 15, at 509-14.
342. Reule, supra note 245, at 2603.  More generally, some have devoted countless hours
of research to document that many vocal supporters of intelligent design have theistic beliefs
and religious motivations for arguing the case for intelligent design.  See, e.g., Brauer, Forrest
& Gey, supra note 15, at 27-38.  This research influenced the court in Kitzmiller.  See Kitzmiller
v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 719 (M.D. Pa. 2005).  This research is based in
part on extensive factual development (which I commend) and deserves a great deal more
critical interaction than I offer in this paper.  For now, I briefly note the following: (1) I agree
that many leading proponents of intelligent design are religiously motivated; (2) I agree that
many proponents of intelligent design explicitly state what they believe to be the religious
implications of their theory to religious audiences; and (3) I agree that some of the leadership
in the intelligent design movement seek to garner support from a broad spectrum of special
creationists.  However, (4) the religious motivations of someone who articulates a scientific
theory does not control the question of whether the theory is inherently religious; (5) opining
upon the religious implications of a scientific theory does not render the theory religious;
(6) seeking support from religiously-minded people and organizations for a scientific theory
does not render the theory religious; and (7) intelligent design theory is not inherently religious
(and, more specifically, is not inherently Christian).  This paper addresses the final point in
some detail, but a complete development of the remaining points (and several others) must
await another day.
343. Cf. Addicott, supra note 15, at 1549 (observing the strategy of lumping all creationists
into “the Fundamentalist camp” of young-earth advocates in order to create “straw-men”);
Campbell, supra note 300, at 16 (“Rather than seeing an educational opportunity of the first
order in the questions raised by contemporary critics of Darwinism and ID advocates, leaders
of the scientific establishment have portrayed all dissent as yet another head of the hydra of
‘fundamentalism.’”).  Indeed, in his Kitzmiller opinion, Judge Jones frames his discussion of
Others publicly argue that the theory of evolution renders the existence of God
all but impossible, or at least irrelevant.340  Still other opponents of intelligent
design make no claim about the existence of God, but disparage the design
movement.341  For example, one law student author, forced to concede that
intelligent design does not refer to the Bible, other religious literature, or even
God, and that it makes no claims regarding morality or an afterlife, ironically
concludes that these features of the theory merely reflect “tactics” that “make
it difficult for the Court to classify Intelligent Design as a religion.”342
Even those opponents of intelligent design who less blatantly deride the
theory tend to link it to other movements and conflate it with other theories,
all the while attempting to undermine its credibility.343  For example, one
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intelligent design in the context of fundamentalism.  See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 711,
716-17.  Given the diverse religious backgrounds of many prominent intelligent design
theorists, and the theory’s dissimilarity with religious objections to evolution often advanced
by some fundamentalists, characterizing intelligent design theory as a version or outgrowth of
fundamentalism is unjustified, if not absurd.
344. See Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 620.
345. Id.
346. For a detailed discussion of the original form of the revisions, see Coleen M. McGrath,
Redefining Science to Accommodate Religious Beliefs: The Constitutionality of the 1999 Kansas
Science Education Standards, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 297, 309-20 (2000).  Among other
controversial features, the nonbinding standards did not encourage students to understand the
key components of large-scale evolution in the life sciences, and the standards defined
“science” as a human activity seeking “logical” (rather than “natural”) explanations for
observations of the world.  In addition, the Board eliminated coverage of the origins of life and
the universe on certain statewide standardized tests.  See id. at  316-19.  These standards were
subsequently replaced after they received negative state and national attention.  See id. at 326-
29.  Revised standards encouraging a more critical analysis of evolutionary theory were
eventually adopted.  See Chang, supra note 8. 
347. Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 622-23.
348. HUGH ROSS, THE CREATOR AND THE COSMOS 19-20 (1993).
349. See id. at 81-85.
350. Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 624; see also id. at 658 (“Darwin’s theory directly
contradicts the biblical story of creation.”).
author describes intelligent design as “the third wave of creationism” — the
first being the ban of evolution instruction from the classroom, and the second
being the requirement of teaching creation science alongside evolution.344
According to this author, intelligent design satisfied the desire of creationists
“to find another method of teaching that did not so closely resemble the
biblical origins of their movement.”345  The author then proceeds to analyze the
teaching of intelligent design in the context of the controversial (and
subsequently reversed, then reformed and resuscitated) adoption of revised
science education standards by the Kansas State Board of Education, which
standards were crafted in such a way as to permit the teaching of
nonnaturalistic theories of life’s origins in the state’s public schools.346  The
author reports the deletion of references to the Big Bang theory (as well as
macroevolution) under the revised standards as among “the most significant
victories for advocates of the intelligent design theory.”347  In fact, intelligent
design is consistent with the Big Bang theory.  Moreover, contrary to the
author’s apparent viewpoint, the Big Bang is widely thought to have theistic
implications,348 which probably account for the early atheistic opposition to the
theory.349  The author also postulates a dichotomy between “Darwin’s secular
theory of biological evolution,” and “the Judeo-Christian theory that a supreme
being created the universe.”350  However, evolutionary creationism, which
embraces biological evolution (even universal common descent), also
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
584 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:527
351. See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
353. Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 626.
354. This issue relates to the interpretive debate over the meaning of the word “day” in
Genesis, which has already been discussed.  See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
355. See, e.g., BEHE, supra note 42, at 5; David Berlinski, The Deniable Darwin, in
DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 157, 158 (referring to the
Cambrian era as “a brief 600 million years ago”).
356. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.  This argument holds only if intelligent
design is a valid scientific inference.  If it is not, it has no place in the public school science
classroom.  A school should not attempt to combat religious hostility in the science classroom
by offering nonscientific arguments that are friendly to religion.
embraces the creation of the universe by a Supreme Being;351 and belief in a
Supreme Being is not unique to Judaism and Christianity.352  In addition, the
author contrasts the scientific estimation of the age of the earth (4.6 billion
years) with “the Bible’s view that the earth is only about six thousand years
old.”353  This contrast further distorts the issues.  What the Bible teaches
regarding the age of the earth is disputed (even among theologically
conservative Christians, many of whom believe in an old earth),354 and
intelligent design theory does not argue for a young earth.  Indeed, leading
intelligent design theorists have openly embraced an old earth.355  The author
has erroneously conflated intelligent design with one tenet commonly held
among advocates of a certain type of special creationism — young-earth
creationism.
It is possible that ignorance of the many interpretations of Genesis, and a
lack of complete understanding of what intelligent design does and does not
advance, combine to explain such conflations and misdescriptions.  It is also
possible that some opponents of intelligent design deliberately mischaracterize
the movement, or at least obfuscate the issues, because of a latent hostility to
all things that hint of the divine — even to scientifically based conclusions
concerning the existence of an intelligent designer who may just be the God
revealed in the Bible.  If a school board concludes that the rather common
attacks on intelligent design (and religious views at least partly consistent with
intelligent design) create a climate that is hostile to certain religious faiths, the
desire to remove such hostility from the public schools by teaching about
intelligent design is a valid secular purpose under Lemon, and one that ought
not be perceived by an objective observer to endorse religion under the
endorsement test.356 
It is also probable that, under some common circumstances, the board’s
decision to authorize the teaching of intelligent design would have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion (within the meaning of the
second prong of Lemon).  On the one hand, intelligent design does not require
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357. See infra notes 383-400.
358. Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 674 (footnotes omitted).
359. See supra Part I.B.1.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 262-277.
a belief in any religious faith.  On the other, whereas evolution (qua exclusive
agency of biological change) is inconsistent with certain religious claims,
intelligent design is not inconsistent with those claims.  Perhaps more
importantly, as long as intelligent design is taught in conjunction with
evolutionary theory, it is likely that the curriculum which offers both theories
is more neutral as between religion and nonreligion than a curriculum that
teaches only evolutionary theory.357
The kind of argument typically advanced against teaching intelligent design
in the public school science classroom is unpersuasive.  Consider the following
line of reasoning advanced by an opponent of intelligent design:
Creationists believe that there are only two positions regarding the
origins of life and of the earth: the Genesis story of creation or
evolution.  If the creationists on the [state school board], an arm of
the government, discredit the theory of evolution in the science
classroom, then by logical syllogism, they automatically credit the
theory of creationism, the story told in the Bible.  One cannot
imagine a clearer example of a governmental endorsement of
religion.358
The author has hardly offered a clear example of endorsement.  First, as
discussed above,359 there are certainly more than “two positions” on origins
conceived by those who may be called “creationists.”  The gamut ranges from
young-earth creationists, who apparently reject any form of large scale
evolution, to evolutionary creationists, who embrace natural selection and
most, if not all, of the notion of universal common descent.  The example does
not illuminate which view has been endorsed.  Second, as discussed above,360
many religions hold to a creator.  Which one has been endorsed?  Intelligent
design itself endorses no particular religion’s understanding of the creator.
Third, if the author’s implicit position ultimately is that some religious concept
of theism (monotheism, polytheism, or perhaps even pantheism) is necessarily
endorsed by intelligent design, even that conclusion is highly dubious.  As
discussed above, some purely philosophical schools hold to an Ultimate
Cause,361 and it is far from clear that intelligent design theory can be attributed
to religious notions of a God or gods to any greater degree than to
philosophical notions of God.
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362. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 731 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
Supposed gaps and problems?  Every accomplished evolutionary scientist is well aware that
there are difficulties, or at least unknowns, in the theory of evolution.  See, e.g., E.N.K.
CLARKSON, INVERTEBRATE PALAEONTOLOGY AND EVOLUTION 45 (4th ed. 1998) (stating that
the emergence of higher taxa “remains the least understood of palaeontological phenomena”;
opining that additional knowledge of the genome should offer “more of an insight into this most
critical yet most elusive of all aspects of evolution”).  The debate centers on whether those
difficulties and unknowns can be explained only by reference to natural processes, and whether
they are of great concern, not whether they are simply “supposed.”  Comments like those
offered by Judge Jones do not bode well for the rigor or persuasiveness of his opinion.
363. As noted previously, Dr. Gould was critical of certain aspects of orthodox neo-
Darwinian thought.  See supra note 22.  Gould’s theory, advanced originally in a paper
coauthored with Niles Eldridge, is known as punctuated equilibrium.  See KENNETH R. MILLER,
FINDING DARWIN’S GOD 82-88 (1999) (discussing that the fossil record negates the gradualistic
Darwinian account of the development of species, and instead points to long periods of gradual
development which are “punctuated” with brief periods of rapid expansion of new species).
364. MILLER, supra note 363, at 170 (describing an interview in which Gould said that it is
comforting “if you can delude yourself into thinking that there’s all some warm and fuzzy
meaning to [life], . . . [b]ut I do think it’s just a story we tell ourselves”). 
365. See generally McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
366. Cf. Luskin, supra note 15, at 597 (observing that “intent matters for those teaching
intelligent design”).
The opinion of Judge Jones in Kitzmiller suffers from a similar weakness.
In analyzing the endorsement test, he writes that an objective adult observer
in the Dover area “would also be presumed to know that ID and teaching about
supposed gaps and problems in evolutionary theory are creationist religious
strategies that evolved from earlier forms of creationism.”362  If teaching about
“supposed gaps and problems” in orthodox evolutionary theory is merely a
creationist religious strategy, we can now relegate notable nontheistic icons of
evolutionary theory, such as Harvard’s Stephen J. Gould, to the camp of
“creationists.”363  Professor Gould would have protested,364 and the notion is
just silly.  Judge Jones’s summary statement suggests that he himself
subscribes to a false duality (i.e., that to critique accepted understandings of
evolution is to reject it outright and embrace only some form of special
creationism) similar to that which the McLean court attributed to “creation
science.”365
Certainly, one can readily imagine situations in which a decision to teach
intelligent design is unconstitutional under existing precedent,366 and this
Article does not imply anything to the contrary.  For example, assume a school
board debates in a public meeting whether to require teachers to present
young-earth creationism to students in the same unit of study that they are
taught the neo-Darwinian synthesis.  Several school board members express
their beliefs that the Bible supports young-earth creationism, the Bible is true,
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367. Thus, if Judge Jones’s findings of fact in Kitzmiller (regarding the events surrounding
the school board’s decision to require the reading in school of the prepared statement) are
correct, he had adequate grounds for concluding that the school board’s actions violated the
Establishment Clause under existing Supreme Court case law.  See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d
at 746-63.  There was evidence that a religious purpose (rather than the goal of enhancing
science education) drove the board’s official actions, see id., and under the Court’s current
approach for determining purpose, it is reasonable to find a violation of the first prong of
Lemon.
368. See id. at 716-23.
369. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
and any version of evolution should be refuted with evidence for a young
earth.  Legal counsel at the board meeting then tells the school board that
requiring this “balanced treatment” has been held unconstitutional.  Because
the Court has not yet addressed the teaching of intelligent design, however,
legal counsel opines that the school could adopt a resolution authorizing and
encouraging teachers to present the theory of intelligent design to their
students.  The school board so resolves.  Assuming these facts, under existing
Supreme Court precedent applying either the Lemon test or the endorsement
test, a court should find the action of the school board unconstitutional.367
In summary, the question of whether intelligent design can be taught in the
public school science classroom necessarily depends on the facts of each case.
Consistent with this observation, and contrary to the conclusion of the district
court in Kitzmiller,368 a court must not strike down a decision to teach
intelligent design merely because it, like many religious faiths, posits an
intelligent designer.  The state does not offend the Establishment Clause
merely by enacting a law that favors or disfavors conduct, or rests upon some
notion that is forbidden, discouraged, encouraged, or embraced by one or more
religious faiths.  That the United States criminalizes murder, theft, and
perjury — all of which are prohibited by the Ten Commandments — does not
mean that the state has codified Judaism, Christianity, or both.  This much the
Supreme Court has acknowledged,369 and the point is especially apropos in the
origins debate.
B. When Does the Constitution Prohibit Government Administrators from
Forbidding the Teaching of Intelligent Design?
Assume a science teacher desires to teach intelligent design in the
classroom, but a school board attempts to forbid the teacher from doing so.
The better view is that in some cases, the school board would be
constitutionally justified in prohibiting instruction in intelligent design.  For
example, if the school board’s decision rests exclusively upon a reasoned,
informed determination that intelligent design is simply a poor scientific
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370. See supra Part III.A.3.
371. See Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 15, at 489-90 (arguing that forbidding
instruction in intelligent design while permitting or requiring the teaching of evolution may
violate religious neutrality).  Even some opponents of teaching intelligent design in the science
classroom acknowledge that banning it entirely (while requiring the teaching of evolutionary
theory) may alienate a significant portion of the population.  See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 15,
at 849. 
372. To illustrate, Richard Dawkins has claimed that “if you meet somebody who claims not
to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid, or insane (or wicked, but I’d rather not
consider that).”  See House, supra note 15, at 387 n.120.
373. Cf. Arianne Ellerbe, Comment, We Didn’t Start the Fire: The Origins Science Battle
Rages On More Than 75 Years After Scopes, 64 LA. L. REV. 589, 606 (2004) (arguing that
refusing to allow presentation of alternative theories of origins may “indicate a hostility and
intolerance toward religion instead of maintaining a spirit of neutrality”).
theory, and if the school board is careful to avoid sending any message of
approval or disapproval of any theological concept of origins, the board’s
decision would likely pose no constitutional problems.  Nevertheless, in some
cases the board’s decision may be constitutionally suspect.  This part of the
Article discusses circumstances in which the Establishment Clause probably
does, or at least arguably may, prevent a school board from forbidding the
teaching of intelligent design.
If the board’s stated reason for its action is that intelligent design must not
be taught because of its religious implications, the board’s action may run
afoul of the First Amendment.  The discussion above establishes that
intelligent design theory is not inherently religious; it merely coincides with
many different religious and philosophical beliefs.370  To forbid the teaching
of intelligent design on account of such coincidence, while simultaneously
permitting or mandating the teaching of evolution (qua exclusive agency of
biological change) notwithstanding its coincidence with religious beliefs, is
hardly consistent with the neutrality norm.371  The board’s action also may be
suspect under the leading Establishment Clause tests. 
First, the board’s decision may reflect a deliberate bias against monotheistic
religious beliefs, or at least those that hold to some form of a special creation,
giving rise to a violation of the first prong of Lemon.  Statements of disdain for
those who hold to certain forms of special creation are not at all uncommon.372
Although intelligent design certainly does not even touch upon many of the
tenets of various forms of special creationism, it nonetheless has one element
in common with all forms — an agent of design.  If the board’s decision
represents an effort to prevent schoolchildren from hearing scientific evidence
that even remotely implies the plausibility of some religious view that
members of the board disfavor, the board’s action violates the first prong of
Lemon.373  Moreover, if an objective observer would perceive the board’s
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374. Of course, that a scientific theory (such as evolution by means of natural selection)
tends to conflict with a religious viewpoint (such as young-earth creationism) does not alone
render the theory unconstitutional.  See Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 385. 
375. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (Burger, C.J.)).
376. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
377. CHARLES DARWIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES DARWIN 1809-1882, at 87 (Nora
Barlow ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1958) (1887).
378. BLACKMORE & PAGE, supra note 127, at 118. 
379. Id.
decision as the disapproval of religion, the decision violates the endorsement
test.374  This conclusion holds even if the stated reason of the board is secular
(for example, that the scientific case for intelligent design is weak).  A court
must examine all of the facts to determine whether hostility towards religious
belief is the real explanation for the government’s decision.  Both religion
clauses forbid “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.”375  A school
board’s secular public justification for a decision to forbid the teaching of
intelligent design may well constitute a thinly veiled attempt to suppress
religiously grounded beliefs about human origins.
Second, even if the board’s purpose is legitimately secular (e.g., to
concentrate instruction on topics that the board considers more important than
intelligent design), the board’s decision in some circumstances may still
present constitutional difficulties.  The second prong of Lemon asks, in
relevant part, whether the primary effect of the board’s action is to inhibit
religion.376  It could be.  The explanation lies in the core of how Charles
Darwin understood his theory theologically, and how subsequent generations
perceive his theory to have theological content. 
Consider the following words of Darwin: “There seems to be no more
design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural
selection, than in the course which the wind blows: Everything in nature is the
result of fixed laws.”377  Similarly, Darwin disclosed that, although he “had no
intention to write atheistically,” he nonetheless did not plainly see “evidence
of design and beneficence on all sides of us.”378  Rather, he observed “much
misery in the world.”379
The perceptive eye cannot ignore that Darwin is doing something that
science, based upon exclusionary methodological naturalism, prohibits: he is
offering theological speculation.  Darwin is not simply arguing that “fixed
laws” explain nature.  He is arguing that natural processes (such as natural
selection) reflect no design.  This position is, of course, consistent with
Darwin’s deistic position.  But for present purposes, what matters is that
Darwin is taking a theological stance.  It is one thing to assert that natural
processes can explain all biological life; it is another thing to assert that God
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380. Ruse, supra note 304, at 365.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Cf. MILLER, supra note 363, at 167 (opining that the reason less than half of Americans
believe that humans evolved from earlier species is the majority’s “well-founded belief that the
concept of evolution is used routinely, in the intellectual sense, to justify and advance a
philosophical worldview that they regard as hostile and even alien to their lives and values”).
384. See supra Part III.A.2.
385. See, e.g., Ernst Mayr, Darwin’s Influence on Modern Thought, SCI. AM., July 2000, at
78, 81 (“Darwinism rejects all supernatural phenomena and causations.  The theory of evolution
by natural selection explains the adaptedness and diversity of the world solely
materialistically.”). 
386. For examples of subtle (and not so subtle) theological descriptions of evolution in
textbooks, see Meyer & Keas, supra note 20, at 142.
387. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 132-33 (1995) (arguing that the
does not design through those processes.  The latter view cannot be established
through mere observation of evidence.  Moreover, to assert that natural
processes lack design is to refute a common theological conception of a God
who works through or upon His creation.  In other words, Darwin is not
simply denying that God necessarily acts by means of special creation; he is
denying that God actively “designs” through evolution.
Darwin’s theological views are interesting for two reasons.  First,
theological speculation is inconsistent with science based on exclusionary
methodological naturalism, at least according to its leading proponents.
Professor Ruse, for example, states that the methodological naturalist “avoid[s]
all theological or other religious references.”380  Again he writes, “[S]cience
has no place for talk of God.”381  Further, “if one goes to a scientist one does
not expect any advice on or reference to theological matters.”382  Under these
standards, Darwin’s views of evolution are not (at least not consistently)
scientific.
Second, Darwin’s theology poses a problem for contemporary science
education in the public schools, for Darwin has deeply affected how
evolutionists understand evolution.383  Certainly, as argued above, evolution —
even evolution qua universal common descent — is not inherently religious.384
Neither does the theory standing alone require that one take a position on how
much, if at all, God has used evolution.  But evolution is not taught in a
vacuum.  It is taught in an educational tradition that properly credits Darwin
with having made the greatest contributions to evolutionary theory.  Like it or
not, how Darwin understood evolution — including his theology — influences
how many understand evolution and its implications,385 and how it is presented
in high school textbooks.386  It is no surprise that many outspoken evolutionists
openly embrace atheistic evolution387 — as do many research biologists.388
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“universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect” for one governed by
a strictly materialistic evolutionary process), quoted in MILLER, supra note 363, at 171. 
388. A recent survey described at a meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion
reports that, among 1,646 scholars at twenty-one leading research universities who represent
experts in three natural sciences and four social sciences, the most “irreligious” field was
biology.  See David Glenn, Religious Belief Is Found to Be Less Lacking Among Social
Scientists, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 15, 2005, http://chronicle.com/daily/2005/08/
2005081504n.htm.  Over 63% of biologists identified themselves as agnostics or atheists.  Id.
This high percentage compares with 55.4% for the combined fields of physics, chemistry, and
biology.  See id.
389. Consider the words of biologist David Hull, writing in what is widely viewed as a
respectable scientific journal: 
XXWhatever the God implied by evolutionary theory and the data of natural
history may be like, He is not the Protestant God of waste not, want not.  He is
also not a loving God who cares about His productions.  He is not even the awful
God portrayed in the book of Job.  The God of the Galàpagos is careless, wasteful,
indifferent, almost diabolical.  He is certainly not the sort of God to whom anyone
would be inclined to pray.
David Hull, The God of the Galàpagos, 352 NATURE 486 (1991) (reviewing PHILLIP E.
JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991)), quoted in MILLER, supra note 363, at 185.
390. The Establishment Clause prohibits the state from dictating curriculum on religious
grounds.  A governmental body that expressly prohibits the teaching of intelligent design
because it violates the theological position of Darwin should be found to have violated the First
Amendment (specifically, the purpose prong of Lemon).
Nor is it surprising that some claim to be atheists precisely because they fully
embrace evolution.389  They are simply following the Darwinian tradition of
denying that God designs through evolution, and taking his deistic
understanding to the next level — an atheistic understanding.
In view of the influence of Darwin on evolutionary thought, it would not be
surprising for public school students (whose opinions are significantly shaped
by their parents and the media) to assume the possibility that a curriculum
advancing evolution (qua exclusive agency of biological change) subsumes
Darwin’s theological position.  A school board’s decision to prohibit
instruction in intelligent design could suggest that this theoretical possibility
is a practical reality, particularly when instructors are not careful in teaching
students that Darwin’s theological views are not essential elements of the
scientific theory of evolution.  The effect may well be (1) to dissuade students
from forming their own religious opinions independently, or even (2) to cause
students to alter their existing religious views.  In either case, the state has
inhibited religion, and may have failed the Lemon test.  Moreover, under
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, a reasonable observer could perceive
state endorsement of a theological position (deistic or atheistic evolution) on
these facts.390
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392. This observation does not mean that the theory of evolution requires a belief that God
serves no active role in nature.  My point is simply that advocates of exclusionary
methodological naturalism believe that evolutionary theory follows from that assumption.
An additional problem exists.  As discussed previously, some philosophers
of science argue that intelligent design is not “scientific” because it violates
exclusionary methodological naturalism.391  Let us now set aside the problem
that Darwin’s version of evolution also violates science based upon
exclusionary methodological naturalism in that Darwinism takes a position on
God’s involvement in nature.  Let us imagine that all high school teachers, and
all textbooks, could successfully and consistently discuss the limits of
scientific methodology.  If the exclusionary version of methodological
naturalism were carefully articulated, broadly communicated, and consistently
employed by scientists who are committed to it, perhaps the origins
controversy would be less volatile than it is today.  Biologists who believe in
evolution by natural selection (and in universal common descent) would
advance the theory as the best theory produced by exclusionary
methodological naturalism.  However, by virtue of the self-imposed limitations
of exclusionary methodological naturalism, evolutionary biologists would
have some difficulty saying, “this theory is the most probable theory of
origins,” let alone “this theory is the only serious explanation of origins,” or
“this is what we know to be true.”  Such statements are in tension with the
claim of exclusionary methodological naturalism that it is deaf and mute
towards theories that are not limited to purely naturalistic explanations. 
But even such careful qualification of the limits of exclusionary
methodological naturalism may not avoid all constitutional problems.  The
theory of evolution (qua exclusive agency of biological change) purportedly
follows from the assumption that God serves no active role in nature.392  One
may rightly question whether the state, through science education or any other
program, generally has any business making any limiting assumptions about
God or propounding theories that purport to be based solely on such limiting
assumptions.  This point is especially pressing when the assumption, like
exclusionary methodological naturalism, is inconsistent with many religious
conceptions of origins.
Confining to mere methodology the assumption that God is unnecessary to
explain any natural phenomenon does not necessarily avoid constitutional
concerns.  At a minimum, the assumption means that the observation of natural
phenomena can never necessarily suggest a supernatural explanation.  In other
words, exclusionary methodological naturalism as articulated by its leading
proponents implies that the scientific study of creation can never discern the
presence of a creator.  This assumption (upon which science is said to rest) is
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393. See, e.g., Psalm 19:1-6; Romans 1:19-20.
394. Newman, supra note 90, at 117.
395. For a thoughtful discussion of the scope and limits of natural theology, see ALLISTER
E. MCGRATH, CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 208-19 (3d ed. 2001).
396. Cf. Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 15, at 502-03 (arguing that teaching only
one theory of origins may violate neutrality, in part because it “presupposes a controversial
epistemology (methodological naturalism)”).
397. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
largely inconsistent with the Biblical teaching (as understood by many) that
the creation points to a Creator.393  Robert Newman speaks for many when he
writes as follows:
Theology studies God’s special revelation in Scripture, while
science studies God’s general revelation in nature.  If biblical
Christianity is true (as I believe), then the God who cannot lie has
revealed himself both in nature and in Scripture.  Thus, both
science and theology should provide input to an accurate view of
reality, and we may expect them to overlap in many areas.394
The relevant point is not that the Biblical teaching on general revelation is
true (although I believe it is).  Rather, the point is that exclusionary
methodological naturalism — a philosophical position — contradicts (or at
least is in great tension with) a common Biblical understanding of general
revelation.395  As argued above, there may very well be no good secular reason
for science to embrace exclusionary methodological naturalism, as opposed to
nonexclusionary methodological naturalism.  If so, a government that endorses
exclusionary methodological naturalism needlessly endorses a philosophy that
largely, if not entirely, defies a religious viewpoint.  This is hardly consistent
with the neutrality norm.396
As the Court in McCreary County stated, religious neutrality is the “central
Establishment Clause value.”397  Government should not embrace an
assumption that violates this value when acceptable alternatives that are more
neutral are available.  Nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is indeed
more neutral.  Insofar as nonexclusionary methodological naturalism assumes
only that a natural explanation may exist for natural phenomena, it tolerates an
inference that a nonnatural explanation may also explain such phenomena,
perhaps even better (at any given point in time).  Thus, nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism is not hostile to theological perspectives, but at the
same time offers theological viewpoints no preference.
This discussion suggests that presenting the theory of evolution as “merely”
the product of exclusionary methodological naturalism may not avoid an
Establishment Clause violation (although articulating the methodological
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assumption behind the theory is probably better than veiling such an
assumption).  The assumption of exclusionary methodological naturalism is
itself problematic.  The solution is to adopt a different methodological
assumption — nonexclusionary methodological naturalism.  Plainly, evolution
through natural selection, as well as universal common descent, can be
presented as features of evolutionary theory produced through nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism.  But such theories could not be presented as the
only theories produced by the scientific method.  The door would be left open
for an inference of nonnatural explanations.  If the state “shuts the door” on all
such theories merely because they appear to have supernatural implications,
the state may have violated the Establishment Clause.
The constitutional concern is especially heightened in the context of public
secondary education.  As the Court observed in Edwards v. Aguillard, families
“condition their trust” in public education “on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may
conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family.”398
Students are “impressionable.”399  The “coercive power” of the government is
great because of compulsory attendance laws, the tendency of students to
emulate teachers, and the susceptibility of children to peer pressure.400  Such
factors reinforce the conclusion that government ought not present science as
a discipline that makes sense only if one assumes the noninvolvement of
supernatural forces (including God) in nature.
In summary, a decision to prohibit the teaching of intelligent design merely
because it is minimally consistent with certain religious conceptions of
biological origins and development would violate the first prong of Lemon.
Further, a decision to prohibit the teaching of intelligent design may be
unconstitutional in some local contexts even if the decision is not grounded in
an unconstitutional purpose.  First, given the theological content ascribed to
the theory of evolution on account of Darwin’s deistic understanding of the
theory, requiring the teaching of evolution while prohibiting the teaching of
intelligent design in some circumstances may violate the effect prong of
Lemon, and may cause a reasonable observer to perceive governmental
disapproval of religious conceptions of origins which are inconsistent with
evolution qua exclusive agency of biological change.  Secondly, presenting the
theory of evolution as merely the product of exclusionary methodological
naturalism is itself constitutionally suspect, insofar as exclusionary
methodological naturalism is a philosophical position that is not scientifically
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compelled, but is in tension with certain theological assumptions about the
nature of creation.
Conclusion
The question of whether intelligent design can be taught in public school
science classrooms (or banished from them) without violating the
Establishment Clause is much more complicated than many would have us
believe.  This Article has argued that intelligent design survives an analysis of
two critical threshold questions.  First, a strong case exists that intelligent
design theory is not inherently religious.  Secondly, intelligent design probably
does not fail to qualify as “scientific” merely because it may be understood to
require (or at least strongly imply) supernatural agency.  The former
conclusion is supported by Supreme Court precedent, an informed view of
theology and philosophy, and logic.  The latter conclusion is supported
(though less plainly) by an appropriate philosophy of science and a preference
for not limiting science so as to offend the constitutional norm of religious
neutrality.
Thus, under the right circumstances, that intelligent design can be taught in
public school science courses is conceivable.  Moreover, in some
circumstances, a governmental actor’s refusal to teach (or to allow the teaching
of) intelligent design may violate the Establishment Clause.  However, these
conclusions do not mean that intelligent design must be taught in the public
schools uniformly across the nation, or even that it should be so taught.
Whether intelligent design theory should be taught necessarily depends not
only upon whether it qualifies as science, but also upon whether it is good
science.  This Article addresses only one aspect of the first contingency (i.e.,
whether science necessarily must avoid supernatural references), and expresses
no view on the second.  Consequently, this Article neither resolves, nor
attempts to resolve, the debate stirring over intelligent design.  
Nonetheless, this Article does contribute importantly to the constitutional
debate over teaching intelligent design in the public schools.  At a minimum,
the analysis supports the following propositions.  First, courts must not dismiss
intelligent design as merely the latest version of Biblical creationism
masquerading in scientific terminology.  On the other hand, courts must
continue to scrutinize curricular offerings that purport to teach intelligent
design in public schools; a danger exists that governmental actors will mislabel
Biblical creationism as “intelligent design” with hopes of circumventing
Supreme Court precedent.  Secondly, intelligent design should force courts to
ponder deeply the constitutional implications of teaching a theory
characterized by a concept that is simultaneously scientific and potentially
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theological.  Finally, educators who have a thorough understanding of
intelligent design theory and who in good faith desire to enrich the public
school science curriculum by teaching it should not hesitate to do so.
Teaching the theory is sure to prompt litigation, but our country should
welcome such litigation.  Intelligent design merits a fair day in court.  May an
informed community of educators hasten that day.
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